Limitation ActComputation of Period of Limitation 26 June 2026· 6 min read

    What are the circumstances under which certain period of time is excluded while computing the limitation period?

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    The Limitation Act, 1963 fixes the length of each period in the Schedule, and then, in sections 12 to 15, lists the situations in which some of the time that has gone by does not count. In each of them the exclusion works by adding the excluded days to the end of the prescribed period. The statute does not restart the clock, and the plaintiff does not get a new period. The circumstances fall into four groups: the time taken to obtain copies in appeals and similar proceedings (section 12), time spent in applying to sue or appeal as an indigent person (section 13), time spent in a wrong court (section 14), and a set of other situations gathered in section 15.

    Section 12 starts with the basic rule in sub-section (1). In computing the period for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which the period is to be reckoned is excluded. Sub-sections (2) to (4) are narrower. For an appeal, an application for leave to appeal, a revision or a review, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order are excluded. Sub-section (3) adds the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment, and sub-section (4) allows the time for obtaining a copy of the award in an application to set it aside. The Explanation provides that time taken by the court to prepare the decree before an application for a copy is made is not excluded. These sub-sections do not apply to suits, and the Supreme Court has held that section 12(2) does not apply to an execution petition (West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corp v Swadesh Agro Farms and Storage Ltd, AIR 1999 SC 3421), although section 12(1) applies to all proceedings.

    Section 13 deals with a person who applies for leave to sue or appeal as an indigent person and is refused. The time during which he prosecuted that application in good faith is excluded, and the court may, on payment of the court fee, treat the suit or appeal as if the fee had been paid in the first instance.

    Section 14 is the longest of the group and the one most often argued. In computing the period for a suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting another civil proceeding against the defendant with due diligence is excluded, whether in a court of first instance, appeal or revision, if the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. Sub-section (2) gives the same relief to an applicant, for the same relief against the same party. Sub-section (3) applies sub-section (1) to a fresh suit filed with the permission of the court under Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where permission was given because the first suit must fail by reason of a defect of jurisdiction or a cause of a like nature. The Explanation says that the day the former proceeding was instituted and the day it ended are both counted in excluding its pendency, that a plaintiff or applicant resisting an appeal is deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding, and that misjoinder of parties or of causes of action is a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction. The claimant must show both due diligence and good faith, and the benefit is limited to civil proceedings in a court.

    Section 15 gathers five more cases. Under section 15(1), where the institution of a suit or the execution of a decree has been stayed by an injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the order, the day on which it was issued, and the day on which it was withdrawn are excluded. Section 15(2) covers a suit of which notice has been given, or for which the previous consent or sanction of the Government or another authority is required under any law: the period of notice, or the time required for obtaining the consent or sanction, is excluded, and in the second case the day the application was made and the day the order was received are both counted. A suit against the State preceded by a notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the commonest example, and the Supreme Court has applied the exclusion to such notices (Union of India v West Coast Paper Mills Ltd, (2004) 3 SCC 458). Under section 15(3), for a suit or execution by a receiver or interim receiver appointed in insolvency proceedings, or by a liquidator or provisional liquidator in a winding up, the period from the institution of the proceeding to the expiry of three months from the date of appointment is excluded. Under section 15(4), a purchaser at an execution sale who sues for possession excludes the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale was prosecuted. And under section 15(5), in computing the period for any suit, the time during which the defendant has been absent from India and from territories outside India under the administration of the Central Government is excluded. In PCK Muthia Chettiar v VES Shanmugham Chettiar (AIR 1969 SC 552) the Supreme Court held that the section makes no exception for a cause of action that arose abroad, and the absence of the plaintiff, as distinct from the defendant, gives no help.

    Two further situations are often confused with these but are in a different category. Section 4 does not exclude time; it lets the party act on the day the court reopens when the last day falls on a closed day. And sections 17 to 19 postpone the start of the period, or begin a fresh one, on account of fraud, mistake, acknowledgment or part payment. They are not exclusions, although in practice a lawyer checks all of them while working out the last day.

    An illustration will show how an exclusion works. A debt falls due on 10 March 2023 and is covered by a three-year article. The ordinary period begins on 11 March 2023 and ends on 10 March 2026. Suppose that before that date the creditor was stayed by an injunction from suing from 1 June 2024 to 30 June 2024. Section 15(1) excludes the whole of the period from the day the order was made to the day it was withdrawn, that is thirty days counting both ends, so the last day moves from 10 March 2026 to 9 April 2026.

    The circumstances of exclusion therefore turn on the cause: copy time, indigence, a wrong court, a stay or notice, an official sanction, a receiver, a failed sale or the defendant's absence. Each of them must be brought within the words of its own section, and the claimant carries the burden of showing that he does.

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