What are the circumstances under which certain period of time is excluded while computing the limitation period?

Exclusion of Time in Computing the Period of Limitation

The law of limitation prescribes fixed periods within which legal proceedings must be instituted. But a rigid application of these periods, without any recognition of circumstances that legitimately delayed the commencement of proceedings, would produce injustice. A party cannot always be blamed for every day that passes before he files his suit or appeal — he may need time to obtain a certified copy of the judgment, he may have been misled into pursuing proceedings before the wrong court, or an order of injunction may have prevented him from executing a decree. It is to address these situations that the Limitation Act, 1963 builds into its framework a series of exclusion provisions — Sections 12 to 16 — each covering a distinct category of circumstances in which certain periods of time shall not be counted in computing the period of limitation.

These provisions are not discretionary — they are statutory commands. No application is required to invoke most of them; it is the duty of the court to give effect to them wherever the circumstances attract them. They are also not saving provisions in the sense of Section 5 — they do not require the showing of sufficient cause. They operate automatically and as of right once the prescribed conditions are satisfied.

The General Principle: Sections 4 to 24 Are Subject to Section 3

Before examining individual exclusion provisions, one foundational principle must be stated: Section 3, which imposes the mandatory duty to dismiss time-barred proceedings, is expressly made subject to Sections 4 to 24 of the Act. The exclusion provisions are part of this framework and must be applied as integral components of the computation of the limitation period. The Supreme Court in India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani (AIR 2003 SC 2084) held that no application is required to be made seeking the benefit of Section 12 — it is the statutory obligation of the court to extend the benefit where available. The period provided under Sections 12 and 14 are to be added to the period prescribed; if such periods taken together expire during vacation, the appeal may be filed on the day the court reopens.

I. Section 12: Exclusion of Time in Legal Proceedings

Section 12 is the most universally applicable of the exclusion provisions. It operates across suits, appeals, and applications, and addresses the time consumed in the process of obtaining certified copies of judgments and decrees. It is structured in four sub-sections.

Section 12(1) provides the foundational rule applicable to all suits, appeals, and applications:

"In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded."

This sub-section reflects the elementary rule of computation: the day on which the cause of action accrues, or the day on which the judgment is pronounced, is not counted as part of the limitation period. The day itself — the starting point — is not a day of limitation. The count begins from the following day.

Section 12(2) extends the exclusion specifically to appeals and applications:

"In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded."

Section 12(3) adds that where a decree is appealed from, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded.

Section 12(4) provides for an application to set aside an arbitration award: the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

The Explanation to Section 12 adds an important qualification: in computing the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree before an application for a copy was made shall not be excluded. The applicant must apply promptly — he cannot wait for the decree to be prepared and then claim the benefit of the time consumed during that preparation. The Supreme Court in Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava (AIR 1961 SC 832) held that the time taken by the court in drawing up a decree after a litigant has applied for its certified copy on judgment being pronounced would be treated as part of the time taken for obtaining the certified copy.

The Concept of "Time Requisite"

The expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy" has been the subject of extensive judicial exposition. Courts have construed it as the time that is properly required — not the time that the applicant conveniently takes. The time requisite covers the interval between the date of application for the copy and the date on which the copy is prepared and ready for delivery — it is immaterial on which date the copies were actually collected.

The delay caused by the negligence or carelessness of a party in paying for the copy cannot be excluded. At the same time, where a judgment is delivered on the last working day before a court vacation and no application for a copy can be made until the court reopens, the entire vacation period is treated as part of the time requisite and is excluded. The principle is that no person shall be required to perform the impossible — the closing of the court for vacation over which the litigant has no control cannot prejudice his rights.

Where copies of the judgment and decree are applied for on the same day, the longer of the two periods required for obtaining the copies is credited to the applicant. Where they are applied for on different days, both periods are excluded — unless they overlap, in which case the same time is not deducted twice.

Scope and Limits of Section 12

Section 12(1) applies to all suits, appeals, and applications. Sub-sections (2) to (4) apply only to appeals, applications for leave to appeal, revisions, reviews, and arbitration matters — they do not apply to suits. Section 12 does not apply to execution applications. It applies by virtue of Section 29(2) of the Act to proceedings under special or local laws unless specifically excluded.

Illustration I

A decree is passed against X on 10 January 2023. The prescribed period for filing an appeal is 30 days. X applies for a certified copy of the judgment on the same day (10 January 2023). The copy is ready and available on 25 January 2023 — a delay of 15 days in preparation. Under Section 12(2) and (3), the following are excluded: (a) 10 January 2023 — the day of pronouncement; and (b) 15 days — the time requisite for obtaining the copy (10 January to 25 January). X's appeal filed on 25 February 2023 is within time.

II. Section 13: Exclusion of Time for Pauper Applications

Section 13 provides that where an application for leave to sue or appeal as an indigent person (a pauper) has been made and rejected, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting in good faith his application shall be excluded from the period of limitation for the suit or appeal.

The rationale is that an indigent litigant who cannot afford court fees and who honestly attempts to obtain leave to sue as a pauper should not be prejudiced in his limitation period by the time consumed in prosecuting that application. The period between the date of making the application and the date of its rejection is to be excluded — provided the application was prosecuted in good faith. Good faith means with due care and attention. A mistaken view of law does not necessarily connote lack of good faith. But the section does not help a person who is guilty of negligence, laches, inaction, or carelessness in prosecuting the pauper application.

III. Section 14: Exclusion of Time Spent in Bona Fide Prosecution Before a Court Without Jurisdiction

Section 14 is one of the most important and most frequently litigated of the exclusion provisions. It provides:

"In computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it."

Sub-section (2) extends the same principle to applications.

The underlying philosophy of Section 14 is one of compassion for honest error. Quite often, because of widespread illiteracy and ill advice, proceedings are initiated in the wrong forum, and because of defect of jurisdiction, they are ultimately dismissed. Under such circumstances, the person prosecuting the earlier proceedings cannot be punished simply because he chose a wrong forum. The theory of exclusion of time has been introduced by Section 14 precisely to save his remedy.

The principle underlying Section 14 is that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits, but failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial.

Conditions for Section 14

The following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be invoked:

• Both the prior and subsequent proceedings must be civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party.

• The prior proceeding must have been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith.

• The failure of the prior proceeding must have been due to a defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature.

• The earlier and later proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue.

• Both proceedings must be before a court — not merely an authority or tribunal.

Exclusion Is a Right, Not a Discretion

The court is not given any discretion in the matter. The litigant is entitled as of right to exclude the period spent in infructuous proceedings where he satisfies the court that he was prosecuting the suit bona fide with due diligence. No separate application is required to explain the circumstances — the pleadings in the plaint will suffice.

In Rabindra Nath Samuel Dawson v. Sivakami (AIR 1972 SC 730), the Supreme Court held that Section 14 must receive a broad and liberal construction so as to advance the cause of justice. In State of Goa v. Western Builders (AIR 2006 SC 2525), the Supreme Court held that Section 14 is applicable to proceedings for setting aside an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Illustration II

A files a suit before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, believing it to have jurisdiction. The suit is dismissed after two years of prosecution for want of jurisdiction. A immediately files a fresh suit in the competent civil court. Under Section 14, the two years spent before the Magistrate are to be excluded from the limitation period for the fresh suit — provided A prosecuted the earlier proceedings in good faith and with due diligence, and the subject matter of both suits is the same.

Where, however, the plaintiffs withdrew the earlier suit but failed to show what the defect of jurisdiction was, the benefit of Section 14 could not be claimed.

IV. Section 15: Exclusion of Time in Certain Other Cases

Section 15 is a composite provision covering several distinct circumstances in which time is to be excluded. It consists of five sub-sections, each dealing with a different situation.

Section 15(1) — Injunction or Order of Stay:

"In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order... shall be excluded."

This sub-section protects a party who, through no fault of his own, is prevented by a court order from instituting a suit or executing a decree. Where the acquisition proceedings are stayed by an injunction, the period of injunction shall be excluded from the period for making an award. The stay or injunction must be one issued by a court — orders by the Executive Government purporting to stay execution do not amount to an injunction under Section 15.

In Gandhi Grah Nirman Sah Samiti v. State of Rajasthan (1993 (2) SCC 662), the Supreme Court held that where acquisition proceedings are stayed by an injunction order, the period of injunction shall be excluded from the period of two years for making an award.

Section 15(2) — Notice Required Before Suit:

Where notice is required to be given before a suit is instituted, the period of the notice is excluded from the computation of the limitation period for the suit.

Section 15(3) — Prior Consent or Sanction Required:

Where prior consent or sanction of a government authority or other body is required before a suit can be instituted, the time taken in obtaining that consent or sanction is excluded.

Section 15(4) — Insolvency:

Where a suit or application for execution has been stayed by reason of the pendency of insolvency proceedings, the period during which it was stayed is excluded from the period of limitation.

Section 15(5) — Absence of Defendant from India:

"In computing the period of limitation for a suit for compensation for an act done in a foreign country, the time during which the defendant has been absent from India shall be excluded."

Courts have given this sub-section a broad construction. The time during which the defendant has been absent from India must be excluded in computing the period of limitation — the section makes no exception for cases in which the cause of action arose outside India or where the defendant was in a foreign country at the time of accrual. In P.C.K. Muthia Chettiar v. V.E.S. Shanmugham Chettiar (AIR 1969 SC 552), the Supreme Court held that in all such cases, the time during which the defendant has been absent from India must be excluded in computing the period of limitation.

Illustration III

A obtains a decree for money against B on 1 January 2020. The period for execution is 12 years. A court order staying the execution of the decree is in force from 1 March 2020 to 1 March 2023 — a period of three years. Under Section 15(1), this period of three years is to be excluded from the computation of the 12-year period. A is entitled to execute the decree within 12 years from 1 January 2020, excluding the three years of stay — effectively until 1 January 2035.

V. Section 16: Effect of Death on Computation

Section 16 deals with the special situation where the person who holds the right to sue, or the person against whom the right to sue exists, dies before the right accrues. This is not strictly an "exclusion" of time but rather a rule for the commencement of the period of limitation in cases of death.

Section 16(1) provides that where a person who would have had a right to institute a suit dies before the right accrues, the period of limitation shall be computed from the time when there is a legal representative of the deceased capable of instituting such suit. Section 16(2) provides the corresponding rule for cases where the person against whom the right would accrue dies before the right accrues — limitation runs from the time there is a legal representative against whom the suit can be brought.

Section 16(3) carves out an exception: nothing in Section 16 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or to suits for possession of immovable property or of a hereditary office.

The Integrated Scheme

Reading Sections 12 to 16 together, the exclusion provisions of the Limitation Act form a principled and integrated scheme that recognises the following realities of legal life:

The thread that connects all these provisions is one of procedural fairness: the law of limitation is designed to compel vigilance, not to punish circumstances that were genuinely beyond the control of the party. Where the delay in filing was caused not by the party's neglect but by the court's own process, by an honest mistake of forum, by a restraining order, or by the absence of the defendant, the law refuses to treat that delay as the party's fault. The exclusion provisions are the mechanism through which this fairness is delivered — automatically, as a matter of right, and without the need for any judicial discretion.