What are the days which could be excluded while computing the period of limitation?

Days That May Be Excluded While Computing the Period of Limitation

The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes fixed periods within which suits, appeals, and applications must be filed. But the mechanical counting of calendar days from the starting point to the expiry of the period is not always the correct method of computation. The Act itself, in its Part III dealing with computation, carves out several categories of days and periods that must be excluded from the count. These exclusions are not discretionary indulgences — they are statutory commands, and it is the duty of the court to give effect to them whether or not any party has specifically prayed for such exclusion.

The foundation for all these exclusions is Section 3 of the Act read with Sections 4 to 24, which together form a complete code for the computation of the period of limitation. Section 3 commands dismissal of every proceeding filed beyond the prescribed period — but Section 3 is expressly made subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24. The exclusion provisions are part of those saving provisions, and they determine what the "prescribed period" actually amounts to in each specific case.

I. The Day from Which the Period Is to Be Reckoned

The first and most fundamental day to be excluded is the very day from which the period of limitation begins to run. Section 12(1) provides:

"In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded."

This provision applies universally — to every suit, every appeal, and every application without exception. The day on which the cause of action accrues, the day on which the judgment is pronounced, or the day on which the right to apply first arises — none of these days are counted as part of the limitation period. The count begins from the following day. This is the ancient principle expressed as dies a quo non computatur in termino — the first day is not counted in the term.

In a matter under the Factories Act, where a complaint was required to be filed within three months of the date when an offence came to the inspector's knowledge, the court held that the day on which the offence came to knowledge is to be excluded in computing the period.

Illustration I

A cause of action for money arises on 1 January 2023. The prescribed period is three years. In computing the three years, 1 January 2023 itself is excluded. The period runs from 2 January 2023 and expires on 1 January 2026. A suit filed on 1 January 2026 is within limitation.

II. The Day of Pronouncement of Judgment in Appeals and Revisions

Section 12(2) provides that in computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal, or for revision or review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced shall also be excluded.

This exclusion is specific to appellate and revisional proceedings. The day of the judgment is not merely the starting point in the abstract — it is a distinct day that is expressly excluded by statutory command. The rationale is clear: on the day of pronouncement, the party has no realistic opportunity to begin the process of appealing. He must first absorb the judgment, and in almost all cases he must obtain a certified copy before he can file an appeal.

III. Time Requisite for Obtaining a Copy of the Judgment, Decree, or Order

Section 12(2) further provides that in computing the period for an appeal, revision, or review, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence, or order appealed from shall be excluded. Section 12(3) additionally provides that the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall be excluded where a decree or order is appealed from. Section 12(4) provides that in an application to set aside an arbitration award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.

The expression "time requisite" has been carefully construed by the courts. It covers the period from the date of application for the copy until the date on which the copy is ready and available — not the date on which the applicant actually collects it.

The Explanation to Section 12 imposes a critical limit: any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy was made shall not be excluded. A litigant who waits passively for the decree to be drawn up, without making an application for a copy, cannot claim the benefit of the preparation period. The Supreme Court in Jagat Dhish Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava (AIR 1961 SC 832) settled this principle definitively: the time taken by the office or court in drawing up a decree after a litigant has applied for its certified copy shall be treated as part of the time taken for obtaining the certified copy of the decree — and is therefore excludable. But the time between pronouncement and application — where the litigant slept — is not excluded.

The benefit of Section 12(2) is not contingent on any prayer or application by the party. Section 12(2) does not require any prayer or application on the part of the party for the exclusion of time spent in obtaining copies — the exclusion is imperative, and it is the duty of the court to exclude such time. The Supreme Court in India House v. Kishan N. Lalwani (AIR 2003 SC 2084) reiterated this duty of the court.

Time for Correcting the Certified Copy

Where the court makes a mistake in the certified copy originally given to the appellant and time is spent in having the copy corrected, that time is also excluded. A mistake committed by the court cannot prejudice the litigant, and the time spent in obtaining a corrected copy shall be deducted while computing the period.

Illustration II

A decree against Y is pronounced on 10 January 2023. The period for appeal is 30 days. Y applies for a certified copy on 10 January 2023 itself. The court takes until 25 January 2023 to prepare the copy. The following days are excluded from computation of the 30-day period:

• 10 January 2023 — day of pronouncement (Section 12(2)).

• 10 January to 25 January 2023 — 15 days, the time requisite for obtaining the copy (Section 12(2) and (3)).

Y therefore has 30 days running from 25 January 2023. His appeal must be filed by 24 February 2023.

IV. Days When the Court Is Closed: Section 4

Section 4 provides:

"Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the court is closed, the suit, appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the court reopens."

The Explanation to Section 4 clarifies that a court shall be deemed to be "closed" on any day when the business of the court cannot be transacted on that day — whether or not the court is formally declared closed. This covers public holidays, declared vacations, strikes by court staff that prevent transaction of business, and natural calamities that render the court non-functional.

Section 4 does not by itself exclude the closed days from computation — it simply provides that where the last day of the period falls on a day when the court is closed, the proceeding may be filed on the first working day after reopening. However, read together with Section 12, the combined effect is that where the prescribed period plus the time for obtaining copies together expire during a vacation, the appeal may be filed on the day the court reopens.

In Basanta Kumar Nath v. Lakshma Moni Nath (AIR 1968 Assam 57), the court held that where Section 3 of the Act is subject to Sections 4 to 24, and where limitation for a suit expires on the 24th but the civil court is picketed from the 19th to the 29th, a plaint filed on the 30th is well within time.

Illustration III

C's period of limitation for filing a revision petition expires on 15 August 2023 — Independence Day, a public holiday when the court is closed. Under Section 4, C may file the revision on 16 August 2023, the next working day. The proceeding is within time.

V. Time Spent in Prosecution of Pauper Application: Section 13

Where an applicant has applied for leave to sue or appeal as an indigent person and that application has been rejected, Section 13 provides that the time during which the applicant was prosecuting that application in good faith shall be excluded from the period of limitation for the suit or appeal.

The rationale is plain: an indigent litigant who honestly attempts to pursue his rights without paying court fees, and whose application is ultimately rejected, should not be penalised for the time consumed in that honest attempt. The condition of good faith is essential — careless, negligent, or dilatory prosecution of the pauper application will not attract the benefit of this section.

VI. Time Spent in Bona Fide Prosecution Before a Court Without Jurisdiction: Section 14

Section 14 provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding against the defendant shall be excluded — where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

The philosophy behind Section 14 is that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits, but failing because the court he chose could not entertain the claim. The entire period during which the prior proceeding was pending before the court without jurisdiction — provided the conditions of due diligence, good faith, and identity of subject matter are met — is excluded from the limitation period for the fresh suit.

In State of Goa v. Western Builders (AIR 2006 SC 2525), the Supreme Court applied the principle of Section 14 to an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, holding that time spent in bona fide but defective arbitration proceedings before a court without jurisdiction should be excluded.

Illustration IV

A files a suit before a court of limited jurisdiction on 1 January 2020. The suit is dismissed for want of jurisdiction on 1 January 2022. A immediately files a fresh suit in the competent court. The two years from January 2020 to January 2022 spent before the wrong court are excluded from the computation of the limitation period for the fresh suit — subject to the conditions of due diligence and good faith being satisfied, and the subject matter being the same.

VII. Time During Which an Injunction or Stay Order Was in Force: Section 15(1)

Section 15(1) provides:

"In computing the period of limitation for any suit or application for execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order, and the day on which it was issued or made, and the day on which it was withdrawn, shall be excluded."

This provision recognises the elementary justice that a party who is prevented from filing a suit or executing a decree by a court order — through no fault of his own — should not be penalised by the running of limitation during the period of that restraint. The entire period during which the injunction or stay was operative — including the day on which it was issued and the day on which it was withdrawn — is excluded.

In Gandhi Grah Nirman Sah Samiti v. State of Rajasthan (1993 (2) SCC 662), the Supreme Court held that where acquisition proceedings were stayed by an injunction order, the period of injunction shall be excluded from the period for making an award under the Land Acquisition Act.

The stay or injunction must be one issued by a court — executive or administrative orders purporting to stay execution do not attract the benefit of this sub-section.

Illustration V

A obtains a decree against B on 1 January 2020. The period for execution is 12 years. A court order staying execution is in force from 1 March 2020 to 1 March 2024 — a period of four years. Under Section 15(1), these four years (including the first and last days of the stay) are excluded from the 12-year computation. A is entitled to execute the decree up to 1 January 2036 (i.e., 12 years from January 2020 plus the four years of stay).

VIII. Time for Giving Prior Notice: Section 15(2)

Where notice of intention to bring a suit is required to be given before the suit may be instituted — as, for instance, under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure (two months' notice to Government) or under various special enactments — the period prescribed for such notice is excluded from the computation of the limitation period for the suit. The law cannot simultaneously require notice and treat the period of notice as part of the limitation period — these two imperatives would contradict each other.

Illustration VI

D has a claim against the State Government. He is required to give two months' notice under Section 80 CPC before filing the suit. The limitation period for his suit is three years. The two months of notice are excluded from the three-year period. D effectively has three years from the date of accrual of the cause of action plus two months to file the suit.

IX. Time During Absence of Defendant from India: Section 15(5)

Section 15(5) provides that in computing the period of limitation for a suit for compensation for an act done in a foreign country, the time during which the defendant has been absent from India shall be excluded. The Supreme Court in P.C.K. Muthia Chettiar v. V.E.S. Shanmugham Chettiar (AIR 1969 SC 552) confirmed this as an absolute rule: the time of the defendant's absence from India must be excluded in computing the period of limitation wherever the section applies.

X. Time During Which Running of Limitation Was Suspended by Acknowledgement or Part Payment: Sections 18 and 19

Where, within the running of the prescribed period, the person liable acknowledges in writing his liability (Section 18) or makes a part payment in respect of the debt (Section 19), a fresh period of limitation commences from the date of such acknowledgement or payment. This is not strictly an exclusion of days in the computational sense, but the practical effect is identical: the days that had already run become irrelevant, and the full prescribed period starts afresh from the date of the acknowledgement or payment.

For Section 18 to apply: the acknowledgement must be in writing, signed by the party, and made before the expiration of the prescribed period. An acknowledgement made after the period has run out cannot revive the extinguished right.

For Section 19 to apply: the part payment must be made before the period has expired, by the person who is actually liable. Payment by a stranger who is not in privity of contract with the creditor does not constitute a valid part payment under Section 19.

Illustration VII

E lends money to F on 1 January 2020. The prescribed period is three years — expiring 1 January 2023. On 1 December 2022, F writes a letter to E acknowledging the debt and asking for three more months to pay. This is a valid acknowledgement under Section 18. A fresh period of three years runs from 1 December 2022. E has until 1 December 2025 to file suit. The days from 1 January 2020 to 1 December 2022 are, in effect, wiped from the computation.

The Cumulative Effect and the Court's Duty

One final principle of great practical importance: these exclusions are not alternative — they are cumulative. The period provided under Sections 12 and 14, for example, are to be added to the period prescribed; if such periods taken together expire during vacation, the appeal may be filed on the day when the court reopens. The court must apply all applicable exclusions simultaneously in computing the precise period available to a litigant.

The court is under a positive and non-discretionary duty to apply these exclusion provisions. No application is required to invoke Section 12 — the exclusion is imperative and must be made by the court in the ordinary course of computing whether a proceeding is within time or not. The same principle applies to all the exclusion provisions: where the facts attract the provision, the exclusion follows automatically, as a matter of law and not of grace.