What are the effects of adoption? Can adoption be revoked?

Section 12 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, which deals with the effects of adoption, is one of the most consequential provisions in the entire statute. It works a complete and irreversible transformation of legal status — it is not a mere transfer of custody, but a permanent severance from one family and a thorough re-birth into another. Section 15 then closes the door firmly behind this transformation by declaring that a valid adoption, once made, cannot be cancelled or renounced. The two sections together give Hindu adoption its defining character: it is not a contract to be rescinded, but a change of status to be lived with permanently.

The Primary Effect: Complete Severance and Rebirth

The opening words of Section 12 lay down the foundational principle with great clarity: an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of the adoptive father or mother for all purposes, with effect from the date of adoption. From that date, all the ties of the child in the family of birth are deemed to be severed and replaced by those created in the adoptive family.

The word "deemed" here carries full legal weight. Courts have consistently held that a statutory fiction of this kind must be given effect with all its logical corollaries — it is not a half-measure. The adopted child becomes entitled to the same rights as a natural-born child of the adoptive family, whether in matters of inheritance, succession, maintenance, or any other legal consequence that flows from the parent-child relationship. The fiction must be carried to its ultimate conclusion and not be permitted to operate only so far as is convenient.

The important practical consequence is that the adoptee can no longer claim any right to succeed to the property of the natural father, mother, or any other relative in the family of birth. Conversely, no right of the adoptee in the family of birth continues merely by reason of being born there — from the date of adoption, that family is, in the eyes of law, a stranger. In Kartar Singh v. Gurdial Singh, the court put this emphatically, holding that upon a valid adoption no rights remain in the family of birth.

The adoption takes effect exclusively from the date of adoption — not earlier. The old doctrine of "relation back," under which an adoption by a widow was treated as relating back to the death of her husband, has been expressly abrogated by the Act. In Abhishek Sharma v. State of U.P., where an adopted child claimed family pension of a freedom fighter who had died forty-five years before the adoption, the Allahabad High Court rejected the claim, observing that this was a glaring example of an attempt to exploit the doctrine of relation back which the Act had firmly discarded.

Three Vital Exceptions: The Provisos to Section 12

The sweeping general rule that adoption severs all ties and replaces them with new ones is subject to three carefully crafted provisos, each protecting a distinct interest.

First, the blood ties of the family of birth are not severed for the purposes of marriage. Proviso (a) to Section 12 provides that the adopted child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married had the adoption not taken place. The bars of sapinda relationship and prohibited degrees of relationship in the family of birth continue to apply after the adoption, even though all other ties with that family are cut. This proviso prevents adoption from becoming a device to create marriages between persons who are biologically closely related. The Explanation to Section 3 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, explicitly recognises this by providing that relationship for the purposes of prohibited degrees includes relationship by adoption.

Second, any property already vested in the adopted child before the adoption is not disturbed. Proviso (b) provides that any property which had vested in the child before the adoption continues to vest in the child, subject to the obligations — including the obligation to maintain relatives in the family of birth — that attach to the ownership of such property. The adopted person is not, by the fact of adoption, divested of rights already belonging to him. A child given in adoption after the death of his natural father does not lose the property that devolved on him by inheritance before the adoption. The court in Har Chand v. Ranjit held exactly this — the natural father having died before the child was given in adoption, the property that had vested on the father's death was protected and could not be taken away by the natural brother after the adoption.

Third, the adoption cannot divest any person of any estate that had already vested in that person before the adoption. Proviso (c) is the counterpart of proviso (b), and addresses the rights of third parties. This proviso put an end to a vast body of litigation that had plagued Hindu law, particularly concerning the doctrine under which a widow's adoption of a son used to divest reversioners of estates that had already vested in them. Under the Act, a widow who adopts a son cannot, by that adoption, dispossess any person of property that had already become his or hers. In Kisan Baburao Memane v. Suresh Sadu Memane, a widow had gifted certain properties in 1948, and an adoption was made in 1973. The Bombay High Court, applying Section 12(c), firmly held that the adopted son could not claim those properties, since they had vested in the defendants long before his adoption.

The Right of the Adoptive Parent to Dispose of Property

A question closely related to the effects of adoption is whether the adoptive parent loses the right to deal freely with his or her own property after making an adoption. Section 13 resolves this with equal firmness: adoption does not, by itself, deprive the adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of property by transfer inter vivos (gift or sale during lifetime) or by will.

The only exception is where there is an agreement to the contrary — that is, where the adoptive parent has specifically agreed, as part of the transaction leading to the adoption, not to alienate the property. Such an agreement is valid and binding between the parties, though it will not bind a transferee for value without notice. In Chiranjilal Srilal Goenka v. Jasjit Singh, the Supreme Court confirmed this position, holding that even where there was an alleged oral understanding that the adopted son would inherit all property, this could not be read as an implied prohibition against the father making a will in favour of someone else, unless the agreement was explicit and unambiguous.

Who is the Adoptive Mother: Section 14

Section 14 deals with an ancillary but practically significant question — who is deemed to be the adoptive mother in different situations. Where a married man adopts a child, his wife is deemed to be the adoptive mother. Where the adoption was made with the consent of more than one wife — as can happen in cases of polygamy — the senior-most wife in marriage is deemed to be the adoptive mother, and the others are step-mothers. Where a widower or bachelor adopts a child, any woman whom he subsequently marries will be the step-mother of the child. And where a widow or an unmarried woman adopts a child, any man she subsequently marries will be the step-father of the child.

Can Adoption Be Revoked? Section 15

The answer given by Section 15 of the Act is a clear and unambiguous no. The section provides in unequivocal terms: "No adoption which has been validly made can be cancelled by the adoptive father or mother or any other person, nor can the adopted child renounce his or her status as such and return to the family of his or her birth."

The provision is absolute and admits of no exception. It operates in both directions — neither can the adoptive parents "return" the child, nor can the adopted child walk away from the status. This is one of the most significant departures from the old law, under which there were some schools of thought that permitted cancellation of adoption under certain circumstances. The 1956 Act forecloses this entirely. Once a valid adoption is made, it is permanent, and the status created by it endures for the lifetime of all parties.

There is, however, an important distinction that must always be kept in mind: Section 15 speaks of a validly made adoption. Where the adoption was void ab initio — because one or more of the conditions required under Sections 6 to 11 were not satisfied — there is no valid adoption in the first place, and the question of cancellation does not arise. A void adoption creates no rights and destroys no rights — it is as if the adoption had never happened at all. But where the adoption was duly made, complying with all requirements, it is, as the Act says, irrevocable. Law has made the adopted child a child of the adoptive family — no human will can undo that.