Distribution of Legislative Power between Union and States 05 August 2026· 5 min read

    What do you understand by Subordinate Legislation?

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    Meaning of Subordinate Legislation

    Subordinate legislation, also called delegated legislation, is the body of rules, regulations, bye-laws, notifications, orders, and schemes made by an executive authority, statutory body, or other subordinate agency, acting under powers conferred upon it by an Act passed by a competent legislature. Unlike plenary legislation enacted directly by Parliament or a State Legislature, subordinate legislation does not derive its authority from the Constitution directly, but from the enabling or parent statute, and it must, at every point, remain confined within the boundaries that the parent Act has drawn for it. If the rule-making authority exceeds these boundaries, the resulting rule or regulation, however formally issued, is liable to be struck down as ultra vires the parent Act, since a delegate cannot claim any power beyond what has actually been delegated to it, a principle captured in the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, meaning a delegate cannot further delegate the power entrusted to it, except where the parent Act itself expressly permits such sub-delegation.

    The necessity for subordinate legislation arises from the practical limitations of the legislative process itself, since a modern legislature, occupied with policy formulation and broad principles, cannot possibly anticipate or provide for every technical detail, administrative procedure, or contingency that may arise in the implementation of a law. Parliament, therefore, lays down the essential legislative policy and the broad framework in the parent Act, while leaving the working details, procedural mechanics, and administrative particulars to be filled in through rules and regulations framed by the executive or other designated authority, thereby achieving both legislative efficiency and administrative flexibility.

    Constitutional Basis and Limits

    Article 245 vests in Parliament and the State Legislatures the power to make laws for the whole or any part of India, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, and it is from this plenary legislative power that the power to delegate rule-making authority to subordinate bodies is itself derived, since a legislature possessing the power to make a law necessarily possesses the incidental power to determine how much of the legislative detail it will itself work out and how much it will leave to be filled in by an executive or other authority. Article 13(3)(a) further clarifies that the term "law" for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution includes any "order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law," thereby expressly bringing subordinate legislation within the sweep of fundamental rights scrutiny, meaning that delegated legislation, exactly like a statute made directly by the legislature, must conform to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III, failing which it would be void under Article 13(2). The Constitution itself, moreover, provides several concrete instances of authorised subordinate legislation, such as Article 145, empowering the Supreme Court to make rules for regulating the practice and procedure of the Court, and Article 309, empowering the appropriate Legislature, or the President and Governor pending such legislation, to make rules regulating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services, both examples of the Constitution itself permitting a subordinate body to legislate on specified matters within a defined field.

    While the power to delegate is thus constitutionally permissible, the Supreme Court has consistently held that this power is not unlimited, and the legislature cannot abdicate its essential legislative function altogether, a boundary developed principally through the doctrine that the legislature must itself lay down the legislative policy and the guiding principles, leaving to the delegate only the task of working out the details within that policy framework.

    Judicial Elaboration Through Case Law

    The foundational treatment of the limits on delegated legislative power in India came in In re Delhi Laws Act, 1912, where a seven-judge Bench of the Supreme Court, answering a Presidential Reference, held that while the legislature can delegate ancillary or subordinate functions of legislation to another body or authority, it cannot delegate its essential legislative function, meaning the determination of legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct, and any provision purporting to delegate this essential function itself, rather than merely its ancillary details, would amount to an unconstitutional abdication of legislative power. This decision remains the cornerstone of Indian delegated legislation jurisprudence, establishing what is often described as the doctrine of "excessive delegation," under which a delegation of power without adequate guiding principles or policy in the parent Act would be struck down.

    This principle was applied and refined in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act that empowered the Central Government to specify, by notification, diseases and conditions to which the Act's advertisement restrictions would apply, without laying down any policy or guidelines to govern the exercise of this power. The Court held that this amounted to conferring uncanalised and uncontrolled power upon the executive, since the legislature had failed to indicate any standard or principle by which the executive was to determine which diseases fell within the restriction, rendering this particular delegation excessive and therefore unconstitutional, even though the rest of the Act was upheld as a valid exercise of legislative power.

    In Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay, the Supreme Court further clarified that the legislature, having laid down the legislative policy in reasonably clear terms in the parent Act, may validly leave the task of working out the details, including matters requiring flexibility or technical adjustment over time, to a subordinate authority, and such delegation, so long as it remains within the framework of policy already declared by the legislature, does not amount to excessive delegation, thereby drawing the line between permissible delegation of detail and impermissible abdication of the essential legislative function.

    The grounds on which subordinate legislation may be challenged were comprehensively summarised by the Supreme Court, holding that delegated legislation can be struck down where it suffers from lack of legislative competence in the delegate, violates fundamental rights under Part III, contravenes any other constitutional provision, fails to conform to the parent statute or exceeds the authority conferred by it, is repugnant to some other enactment of the land, or is manifestly arbitrary or unreasonable to an extent suggesting the legislature never intended to confer such rule-making authority at all, a comprehensive list reflecting the layered scrutiny to which subordinate legislation, unlike plenary legislative enactments protected by legislative supremacy, remains permanently subject.

    Illustration

    Suppose Parliament enacts a statute establishing a scheme for regulating food safety standards, laying down the broad legislative policy that food articles sold in India must meet prescribed safety and quality standards, and empowering the Central Government to frame detailed rules and regulations specifying permissible additives, labelling requirements, and testing procedures. The rules subsequently framed by the Central Government under this delegated power would constitute subordinate legislation; they derive their entire validity from the parent Act, must remain confined to the policy of ensuring food safety already declared by Parliament, and cannot be used, for instance, to impose an entirely new tax or penalty not contemplated by the parent Act, since such an act would exceed the authority conferred and would be struck down as ultra vires, following the reasoning applied in Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India. If, however, the parent Act had merely stated that the Central Government "may regulate food articles as it deems fit," without laying down any standard, purpose, or policy at all, such a delegation itself, being wholly uncanalised, could be challenged as an unconstitutional abdication of essential legislative function, consistent with the principle established in In re Delhi Laws Act.

    Forms of Subordinate Legislation

    Subordinate legislation is often classified according to the nature of the delegate exercising the power.

    • Executive legislation, where rule-making power is delegated to the Central or State Government or to departments of the executive, such as rules framed under the Environment (Protection) Act.

    • Municipal or local legislation, where local bodies such as Municipal Corporations or Panchayats are empowered to make bye-laws regulating matters within their local jurisdiction.

    • Judicial legislation, where superior courts are empowered to frame rules regulating their own practice and procedure, as under Article 145 for the Supreme Court.

    • Autonomous body legislation, where statutory or autonomous bodies such as Universities or Railway administrations frame regulations governing their internal affairs within the powers conferred by their constituting statutes.

    Subordinate legislation, therefore, occupies a carefully supervised position within India's constitutional and legal order: indispensable for the practical functioning of modern governance, yet permanently accountable to the parent statute that creates it and to the constitutional limits the Supreme Court has consistently enforced, from In re Delhi Laws Act through Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India and Vasantlal Maganbhai Sanjanwala v. State of Bombay, ensuring that the executive's rule-making power remains an instrument for implementing legislative policy rather than a vehicle for legislating independently of the sovereign legislature's declared will.

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