What do you understand by the maxim "Law of limitation simply bars judicial remedy; it neither affects extra judicial remedies nor the substantive right itself"?
The maxim has two halves, one about the kind of remedy that limitation touches and the other about the right that it leaves alone. The second half is easy to defend. The first needs more care.
A judicial remedy is any proceeding in which the coercive process of the State is invoked, such as a suit, an appeal, an application for execution or a petition. All of these fall within section 3 and the Schedule. An extra-judicial remedy is a step that a creditor or owner can take without the help of a court and that the lapse of time does not stop. A creditor can accept a voluntary payment and appropriate it, a mortgagee in possession can hold on to the property until he is paid, and parties can adjust their accounts by agreement. In each case the creditor is not asking the State to enforce anything, so there is nothing for limitation to bar.
Arbitration is not an extra-judicial course that escapes limitation. Section 43(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies the Limitation Act, 1963 to arbitrations as it applies to proceedings in court. A claim that would be barred in court is therefore equally barred before an arbitrator, and an arbitration clause cannot be used to revive it.
That the substantive right survives is shown in several ways. The Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank v Surendra Prasad Sinha (AIR 1992 SC 1815) held that limitation bars the remedy and not the right, so that the right may still be raised in defence. The Sikkim High Court in Chabilal Khatiwada v Durga Prasad Rai (AIR 2013 Sikk 14), held that although the right to enforce a debt by judicial process is barred after the prescribed period, the right to the debt remains. The clearest statutory proof is section 25(3) of the Contract Act, which makes a signed written promise to pay a time-barred debt enforceable. Sections 18 and 19 of the Limitation Act do not serve this purpose. They operate only on an acknowledgment or payment made within the existing period, and so say nothing about what happens once it has run out.
There is, however, an important qualification on the second half of the maxim. Section 27 extinguishes the right to property when the time for a suit for possession expires, and the person in adverse possession then holds a good title. Outside that section the right survives the bar, and under it the right dies together with the remedy. The Supreme Court in Prem Singh v Birbal ((2006) 5 SCC 353) recognised section 27 as the exception to the general rule.
A final word concerns what counts as an acknowledgment. In Sree Rengaraj Steel and Alloys Ltd v MSTC Ltd (AIR 2023 Mad 278), the Madras High Court held that a unilateral adjustment of account in a ledger kept by the creditor alone was not an acknowledgment of payment capable of extending limitation under section 19. That decision turns on what the statute requires and is no authority for the maxim itself.
Limitation closes the courts, and with them arbitration, to a stale claim. It does not reach the debt, the defence, voluntary payment or the creditor's own lawful retention of security, and it leaves the substantive right in place except where section 27 declares otherwise.
Get weekly legal insights
Case-law digests, exam tips & curated study guides — straight to your inbox.
No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.
