What important points of law have been decided in the following reported judgments? — (a) V. Dhanpal Chettiar v. Yesodaiammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 (b) S.P. Gupta & Others v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. (c) Keshavnand Bharti v. State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461. (d) Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789.
(a) V Dhanpal Chettiar v Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745 : (1979) 4 SCC 214. This case is cited in constitutional law for a point about the division of legislative power between the Union and the States. The question was under which entry of the Seventh Schedule a State law on rent control falls. A State Legislature has power over "land" under Entry 18 of List II, and it might be argued that a law regulating the occupation of buildings by tenants is a law about land. The Court treated it differently. The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, was held to fall within the topics of the transfer of property and contracts. It therefore falls under Entries 6 and 7 of List III, the Concurrent List, which cover the transfer of property other than agricultural land and contracts, and not under the State entry on land. The importance of the holding is that a law of this kind is treated as one on the transfer of property and on contracts, and not as a law on land.
(b) S P Gupta v President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 : 1981 Supp SCC 87. This case, decided by a bench of seven judges, is known as the First Judges Case. Several lawyers from different High Courts filed writ petitions under Article 226, and all of them were transferred to the Supreme Court for disposal. The case raised the appointment, the transfer and the continuance of High Court judges, and decided a number of separate points.
Locus standi and public interest litigation. The Court held that a person who is not himself injured can approach the court in the public interest. Bhagwati J said that any member of the public having sufficient interest can maintain an action for judicial redress for a public injury arising from a breach of public duty, or from a violation of a provision of the Constitution or the law, and can seek enforcement of that duty and observance of that provision. This discarded the older rule that only the person whose own legal right is violated may go to court, and it is regarded as the beginning of public interest litigation in India.
Appointment of High Court judges. The main question was whose opinion should prevail among the functionaries who take part in the appointment of a High Court judge: the Chief Justice of India, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Central Government. The majority read the word "consultation" in Articles 124(2) and 217(1) literally. In their view the opinions of the Chief Justice of India and of the Chief Justice of the High Court were only consultative. The power of appointment rested solely and exclusively in the Central Government, which could override those opinions. The Chief Justice of India therefore had no primacy, and the Government was not bound to act on the opinions even when all the consultees agreed. This view was criticised in Subhesh Sharma v Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 631, which stressed that the role of the Chief Justice of India is of crucial importance in appointments and referred the question to a larger bench. A bench of nine judges then overruled the majority view in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268 (the Second Judges Case). It gave the Chief Justice of India's opinion the greatest weight and treated selection as a participatory consultative process in which the Executive acts as a check.
Transfer of High Court judges. The transfer of a judge from one High Court to another under Article 222 was also examined. Bhagwati J held that a judge could not be transferred without his consent, that a transfer could be made only in the public interest, and that a transfer made as a punishment can never be in the public interest. Since a transfer is a serious matter, the burden of justifying it lies on the Government. The other judges did not agree that consent is needed. The majority held that the consent of the judge is not necessary. They also held that the power of transfer is not absolute. It is subject to two conditions: it must be in the public interest, and it must follow full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India. An order of transfer can be quashed if it was not in the public interest, if it was made without full and effective consultation, or if the opinion of the Chief Justice of India was brushed aside. Bhagwati J held the transfer of the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court bad, because there was no full and effective consultation and the transfer was by way of punishment.
Additional judges. The Court also examined in detail the appointment of additional judges to the High Courts.
Strength of judges. The Court held that the number of judges in a High Court is not a justiciable question. This was later overruled. In a later decision the Supreme Court held that fixing the strength of judges is justiciable, relying on Article 21, which makes speedy justice a constitutional requirement. The Court cannot fix the number itself, but it can direct that the strength be reviewed.
Article 74(2) and disclosure. On Article 74(2), Bhagwati J took a narrow view of the clause. It protects the advice tendered to the President and the secrecy of the discussions between the President and the Council of Ministers, and it does not immunise the acts of the President. The material on which the advice is based is not itself the advice. This view did not follow the wider reading given to the parallel provision in Article 163(3) in State of Punjab v Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493.
(c) Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461 : (1973) 4 SCC 225. The petition was filed under Article 32 by Swami Kesavananda Bharati, the head of a mutt in Kerala, to challenge the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Amendments. Because the earlier decision in Golak Nath had been given by eleven judges and was under review, the case was heard by all thirteen judges of the Court. The hearing lasted sixty-eight days, the longest in the history of the Court. Eleven separate opinions were delivered on 24 April 1973, together running to more than a thousand pages. The main points decided were these.
First, the power to amend the Constitution is found in Article 368 itself. It is not hidden in Parliament's residuary power, because it was hard to believe that the framers had left so important a power there. The view in Shankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh was endorsed on this point, and the contrary view in Golak Nath was overruled.
Second, the Constitution makes a distinction between the Constitution and the laws. The word "law" in Article 13 does not include a constitutional amendment, so Article 368 can be used to abridge a Fundamental Right or any other part of the Constitution. To this extent Golak Nath was overruled, and the Twenty-fourth Amendment, which made this explicit, was held valid. The amended Article 368(2) also requires the President to give assent to a Bill to amend the Constitution passed by both Houses.
Third, and most important, the amending power is not unlimited. The majority held that Parliament cannot use it to destroy or emasculate the basic or fundamental features of the Constitution, and that an amendment which offends the basic structure is void. Seven of the thirteen judges held this, but they differed on what the basic structure consists of, and no judge gave a complete list. Sikri CJ listed the supremacy of the Constitution, the republican and democratic form of government, the secular character of the Constitution, the separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and the federal character of the Constitution, all resting on the dignity and freedom of the individual. Shelat and Grover JJ added the sovereignty of the country, the dignity of the individual secured by Part III together with the mandate to build a welfare State in Part IV, and the unity and integrity of the nation. Khanna J named democratic government, the parliamentary structure of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, the secular character of the State and the rule of law in the sense of the supremacy of the Constitution and law over arbitrariness. He did not treat the Fundamental Rights as a whole as part of the basic structure. It has also been stated that the basic features include the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India, the federal system, judicial review and the parliamentary system of government.
Fourth, the Court answered a question left open in Golak Nath. Parliament cannot rewrite the Constitution or bring in a new one, since it can do only what leaves the basic features intact.
Fifth, applying the doctrine, the second part of section 3 of the Twenty-fifth Amendment was held invalid. It had provided that no law containing a declaration that it gave effect to the policy of Article 39(b) or (c) could be questioned in a court on the ground that it did not give effect to that policy. Because judicial review is an essential feature of the Constitution, a legislature could not be allowed to shut out the courts by adding such a declaration to an Act. The right to property was not treated as a basic feature, and its abrogation was upheld.
The decision is generally seen as an improvement on Golak Nath. That case protected only the Fundamental Rights, although other parts of the Constitution may be equally important, and it put all of them beyond amendment. Kesavananda protects every basic feature, whether it lies in Part III or elsewhere, and leaves Parliament free to amend the rest. It has also been observed that the terms "fundamental features" and "abrogation" are vague, leaving the courts a good deal of room to decide case by case.
(d) Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 : (1980) 3 SCC 625. The petitioner challenged the taking over of the management of its textile mill under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974, and an order under section 18-A of the Industrial (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951. The 1974 Act had been placed in the Ninth Schedule by the Thirty-ninth Amendment. The petitioner also challenged clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368, introduced by the Forty-second Amendment, because if they were valid the petitioner could not question the Thirty-ninth Amendment, and the amendment to Article 31C made by the same Amendment. A majority of four to one reaffirmed that Parliament cannot, under Article 368, amend the Constitution so as to damage its basic or essential features or destroy its basic structure.
Clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368 were struck down. Clause (4) sought to take away the power of the courts to question any constitutional amendment. The Court held that this would make the Fundamental Rights a mere adornment, rights without remedies, and would turn a controlled Constitution into an uncontrolled one. Judicial review is a basic feature. Clause (5) gave Parliament power to amend without any limit, even to repeal the Constitution. The Court held that the power to destroy is not a power to amend. Parliament has only a limited power of amendment, and a limited amending power is itself a basic feature. Parliament cannot enlarge that power into an absolute one, because the holder of a limited power cannot, by using it, make it unlimited. Bhagwati J, who dissented on one point, agreed that both clauses were invalid. He added that the two clauses were linked and that clause (5) could not remove a doubt that did not exist.
The Court also dealt with the Forty-second Amendment's extension of Article 31C. Before 1976 Article 31C protected laws giving effect to the principles in Article 39(b) and (c) from challenge under Articles 14 and 19. The Amendment extended this to laws giving effect to any Directive Principle in Part IV. The majority held that the extension destroyed the basic structure and was beyond the amending power. The Constitution is founded on a balance between Part III and Part IV. The Directive Principles must be achieved without abrogating the means provided in the Fundamental Rights, and the two parts together form the core of the Constitution. To give either absolute primacy over the other would disturb the harmony, and the balance between them is an essential feature of the basic structure. Since a large part of modern legislation can be said to implement some Directive Principle, Articles 14 and 19 would be put out of operation for most laws and Article 32 would lose much of its force. Chandrachud J observed that Articles 14, 19 and 21 stand between freedom and the abyss of unrestrained power, and that Article 31C had removed two sides of that golden triangle. As a result, Article 31C returned to its position before 1976, so that it protects only laws made to implement Article 39(b) and (c).
Bhagwati J upheld the extension of Article 31C, though with a gloss. Where a law claims protection, the Court should first ask whether there is a real and substantial connection between the law and a Directive Principle, and whether its predominant object is to give effect to it. Only those provisions that are essentially and integrally connected with that object would be protected.
On the other hand, the changes made by the Forty-second Amendment to the Preamble, which added "socialist" and "secular" and changed the commitment to the "unity of the nation" to the "unity and integrity" of India, were accepted by all five judges. The Court called it an example of the amending power being exercised consistently with the creed of the Constitution.
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