What is Force? Distinguish between Criminal Force and Assault.

What is Force? — Section 349 IPC / Section 128 BNS

The term "force" is not used in its scientific sense. The Code defines it narrowly in relation to a human being. Section 349 of the IPC (now Section 128 of BNS) provides that a person is said to use force to another when he causes motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion to that other. This motion may be caused in three ways:

1. By his own bodily power.

2. By disposing of any substance so that motion is produced without further action.

3. By inducing any animal to move, change its motion, or cease to move.

It is vital to note that force, as defined here, applies only against a person and not against an inanimate thing. As was clarified in Maiku v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1953 All 749), breaking open a lock or destroying property does not amount to the use of force within the meaning of this section, because force must be directed against a person. The section does not by itself create an offence — it merely defines the concept which is then carried into the offence of criminal force.

Criminal Force — Section 350 IPC / Section 129 BNS

Force, by itself, is not criminal. What elevates ordinary force into criminal force is the mens rea accompanying it. Section 350 IPC (Section 129 BNS) provides that whoever intentionally uses force to any person, without that person's consent, in order to commit any offence, or intending by such force to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will cause injury, fear, or annoyance to that person, is said to use criminal force.

Ingredients of Criminal Force

To constitute criminal force, the following must all concur:

1. Intentional use of force — the act must be wilful, not accidental.

2. Against a person — not against objects or things.

3. Without consent — the person against whom force is used must not have consented to it.

4. Purposive element — it must be used either to commit an offence, or with the intent to cause, or with knowledge that it is likely to cause, injury, fear, or annoyance.

In Chandrika Sao v. State of Bihar (AIR 1967 SC 170), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the nature and extent of the offence of criminal force depend entirely upon the offender's intention, knowledge, and the likelihood of causing injury, fear, or annoyance. The Court emphasised that to constitute criminal force it is not necessary that the offender had any particular instrument or weapon in hand.

The Code's own Illustrations

The Illustrations appended to Section 129 BNS (Section 350 IPC) are among the finest pedagogic tools in the criminal law. They deserve study because they show just how wide the concept of criminal force truly is:

• The Drifting Boat (Illustration a): Z is sitting in a moored boat. A unfastens the moorings and lets the boat drift downstream. A has not touched Z, but he has caused motion to Z by disposing of substances — unfastening the rope — so that motion results without further action. If this was done intentionally without consent, intending injury, fear, or annoyance, it is criminal force.

• The Lashed Horses (Illustration b): A lashes Z's horses while Z is riding in a chariot, causing them to quicken pace. A has caused change of motion to Z by inducing animals. Criminal force is established if done with the requisite intention.

• The Stopped Palanquin (Illustration c): A, intending to rob Z, seizes the pole of Z's palanquin and stops it. A has caused cessation of motion by bodily power — a classic illustration of criminal force to facilitate theft.

• Pulling a Woman's Veil (Illustration f): A intentionally pulls up a woman's veil. This is the use of force, and if without consent and done to cause injury, fear, or annoyance, it is criminal force. This simple illustration has been extensively used by Indian courts in cases involving outrage of modesty.

• Pouring Boiling Water (Illustration g): A pours boiling water into Z's bath. A, by his bodily power, causes the motion of water which brings it into contact with Z.

• Inciting a Dog (Illustration h): A incites a dog to spring upon Z without Z's consent. Using an animal as an instrument to produce physical contact with another is criminal force.

What these illustrations collectively establish is that direct physical contact is not required. Force may be used through intermediaries — animals, substances, tools — as long as it is intentional and produces motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion in the person against whom it is directed.

Assault — Section 351 IPC / Section 130 BNS

Here lies the most conceptually interesting distinction. Assault is not the application of force — it is the apprehension that force is about to be applied. Section 351 IPC (Section 130 BNS) defines assault as making any gesture or preparation, intending or knowing it likely that such gesture or preparation will cause any person present to apprehend that the person making it is about to use criminal force to him.

The gist of assault lies entirely in the effect produced in the mind of the victim — the reasonable apprehension of impending criminal force. There need be no actual touching, no physical contact, and no application of force. An assault is, in essence, attempted criminal force which is perceived by the victim.

Key ingredients of Assault

1. Gesture or preparation — some overt physical act must be made.

2. In the presence of another — the intended victim must be present.

3. Intention or knowledge — the person making the gesture must intend, or know it to be likely, that it will cause apprehension of imminent criminal force.

The Explanation to Section 130 BNS immediately clarifies a fundamental rule: mere words do not amount to an assault. However, words may so qualify a gesture as to give it the meaning of an imminent threat. If a man raises a stick and simultaneously says "I will break your head," the gesture combined with the words together constitute an assault, even if the words alone could not.

The Code's own Illustrations

• Illustration a: A shakes his fist at Z, intending or knowing it likely that Z will thereby believe A is about to strike him. This is assault — the gesture creates apprehension.

• Illustration b: A begins to unmuzzle a ferocious dog, intending or knowing it likely that Z will believe the dog is about to be set upon him. Assault is complete — the preparation creates apprehension of criminal force.

• Illustration c: A takes up a stick saying to Z, "I will give you a beating." Alone, the words amount to nothing; alone, the gesture of picking up a stick may not amount to much. Together, the gesture explained by the words constitutes an assault.

The Allahabad High Court in Mohadeo Pandey v. Emperor (AIR 1932 All 372) held that pointing a gun at a person, lifting a lathi to strike another, or throwing brickbats which create apprehension of imminent criminal force — all amount to assault. The essence in each case is the reasonable apprehension created in the mind of the victim.

It is equally settled that a mere menace of future injury does not amount to assault. A threatening letter saying "I will harm you tomorrow" is not an assault because the threat is not of immediate and present force. Assault requires the apprehension of immediate application of criminal force.

Assault and Criminal Force Distinguished

The textbooks present this distinction succinctly, and the BNS itself groups them together for punishment — but they are conceptually distinct. The relationship between them in Indian law mirrors the relationship between assault and battery under English law.

As the commentary in the text puts it — the Sanhita classifies the infliction of bodily pain into three ascending categories: Assault → Criminal Force → Hurt. Touching another person in anger, or spitting on a man's face, is something more than a mere assault but less than a hurt — these are instances of criminal force. The progression is elegantly structured: assault is where the apprehension begins; criminal force is where the body is actually moved, changed, or restrained; hurt is where bodily pain or injury follows.

Punishments and Aggravated Forms

The basic punishment for assault or criminal force otherwise than on grave provocation (Section 352 IPC / Section 131 BNS) is imprisonment up to three months, or fine up to one thousand rupees (enhanced in BNS), or both. The offence is non-cognizable and bailable, triable by any Magistrate.

The BNS recognises several aggravated forms, creating a ladder of higher punishment:

• Section 132 BNS (Section 353 IPC) — Assault or criminal force to deter a public servant from discharge of duty: imprisonment up to 2 years, or fine, or both. The key element is that the public servant must be acting in the lawful exercise of his duty. In Mohd. Ayub v. State of Bihar (1974 Pat LJR 150), it was held that a mere obstruction without physical force does not satisfy this section — there must be actual assault or use of criminal force.

• Section 133 BNS (Section 355 IPC) — Assault or criminal force with intent to dishonour a person otherwise than on grave provocation: imprisonment up to 2 years. The intent to dishonour is the gist. Where an accused, while under trial, struck a police sub-inspector who was giving evidence against him, he was held guilty under this provision because the clear intention was to dishonour.

• Section 134 BNS (Section 356 IPC) — Assault or criminal force in attempting to commit theft of property being worn or carried: imprisonment up to 2 years. This section is primarily directed at pickpockets and snatch-thieves. The offence is complete as soon as the accused touches the person intending to steal — he need not have actually stolen the property.

• Section 135 BNS (Section 357 IPC) — Assault or criminal force in attempting to wrongfully confine a person: imprisonment up to 1 year, or fine up to five thousand rupees (enhanced in BNS), or both.

• Section 136 BNS (Section 358 IPC) — Assault or criminal force on grave and sudden provocation: simple imprisonment up to one month, or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both. This is the mitigated version, where provocation reduces the punishment.

The rule against invoking mitigation is equally firm. The Explanation to Section 131 BNS states that grave and sudden provocation will not mitigate punishment if the provocation was sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse, or if it was given by anything done in obedience to law, or in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

The Relationship to Other Offences

It is worth noting that these three concepts — force, criminal force, and assault — do not operate in isolation. They are foundational building blocks for several other offences in the Sanhita. Assault or use of criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty (Section 74 BNS / Section 354 IPC), assault with intent to disrobe (Section 76 BNS / Section 354B IPC), and even the offence of robbery under Section 309 BNS / Section 390 IPC all depend on these definitions. In Rupan Deol Bajaj v. KPS Gill (AIR 1996 SC 309), the Supreme Court held that the act of slapping a senior woman IAS officer on her posterior at a dinner party constituted criminal force used to outrage her modesty under Section 354 IPC — demonstrating that the slightest application of intentional, non-consensual force against the body of a woman with the requisite knowledge or intention is sufficient to attract criminal liability. The Court expressly rejected the argument that the act was trivial and therefore exempt under Section 95 IPC, holding that offences against women cannot be treated as trifles.