What is legal disability? To what extent such disability extends the period of limitation under the Indian Limitation Act?
Legal disability, in the Limitation Act, 1963, means one of three conditions of the person who has the right to sue: minority, insanity or idiocy. The Act has no definition section for it. Section 6(1) lists the three conditions and attaches a consequence to them: "Where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule." The idea behind the rule is plain enough. Time runs against a claimant because he could have sued and did not. A child, or a person without a sound mind, cannot be said to have slept on his rights in that sense, so the law gives him a fresh run after the incapacity ends.
Three points about the meaning of the term should be fixed at the start. First, the Explanation to section 6 says that "minor" includes a child in the womb, so the protection reaches a child who is conceived but not yet born when the cause of action arises. The Calcutta High Court applied this in Aswini Kumar Pan v Parimal Debi (AIR 1964 Cal 354), where a posthumous son sued within three years of attaining majority to set aside a kobala executed by his mother while he was in the womb, and the suit was held to be in time. Second, majority is fixed by the Indian Majority Act, 1875, at eighteen years, or twenty-one where a guardian has been appointed by a court or the minor's property is under the superintendence of a court of wards. Third, the words "insane" and "idiot" are old words. The Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 speaks of mental illness, and section 6 has not been amended to follow it. The claimant's condition should therefore be stated in plain terms and proved from evidence to show that he lacked the capacity to manage his affairs when time began to run, without reliance on a label.
As to how far the extension goes, the answer has two halves. The first half is section 6 itself. The disabled person does not get an exemption from limitation; he gets the same period that anyone else would have had, but counted from the day his disability ends. Section 6(2) deals with two disabilities existing together, or with a second disability that sets in before the first has ceased, and gives him the same period after both have ended. Section 6(3) applies where the disability lasts until death: the legal representative may sue within the same period after the death. Section 6(4) provides that if that legal representative is himself under a disability at the date of death, sub-sections (1) and (2) apply to him. Section 6(5) covers a person who dies after his disability has ceased but while his extended period is still running; his legal representative may sue within the same period after the date of death as would have been available to him.
The second half is section 8, which sets the ceiling. It provides that nothing in section 6 or section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, "or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit or application." Section 8 is a proviso to sections 6 and 7, and the Supreme Court has said so in Darshan Singh v Gurdev Singh ((1994) 6 SCC 585 : AIR 1995 SC 75), which it followed in Bailochan Karan v Basant Kumari Naik (AIR 1999 SC 876 : (1999) 2 SCC 310). The way to read the ceiling is that it limits only the extension. It does not cut down the ordinary period. The disabled person may therefore sue within the longer of two periods: whatever is left of the ordinary period under the Schedule, or the extension granted by section 6 as capped by section 8. Where the ordinary period is shorter than three years, the section 6 extension is just that shorter period, and section 8 does not enlarge it to three years.
Two illustrations show the working. B, who was born on 10 March 2008, is owed a debt that falls due on 15 September 2014, when he is six. The suit is governed by a three-year article, so the ordinary period expires on 15 September 2017, long before B is a major. B attains majority on 10 March 2026. He may sue within three years from that date, that is until 10 March 2029, because the day of cessation is excluded in the computation. For the second illustration take a person born on 1 July 1997 whose land is taken adversely when he is three, on 1 July 2000. The twelve years under Article 65 end in July 2012, while he is still a minor. Section 6 alone would give him twelve years after majority, but section 8 reduces that to three, so his last day is 1 July 2018. Had he been dispossessed at sixteen the ordinary period would have run on well past his majority, and he would simply sue within it.
The provision is limited in four ways that an answer should mention. It helps only a person who was already under disability when the period began to run, and not one who falls into disability later (section 9). It applies only to suits and to applications for the execution of a decree; it does not apply to appeals, and it does not help a person who is sued. The benefit is personal to the person disabled, as the Supreme Court held in Nathu Ram v Manphool ((1996) 4 SCC 462): the extension that a child in the womb enjoyed was his alone, and co-claimants who were alive and under no disability could not shelter behind it. And it gives way where a special or local law excludes it, under section 29(2).
In short, legal disability postpones the end of limitation for a minor, a person of unsound mind or an idiot who was in that condition when time began. The postponement is to the same period after the disability ceases, but it can never carry the right to sue beyond three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected, except to the extent that the ordinary period itself runs longer.
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