What is meant by 'relevancy of facts'? When are opinions of third persons relevant? Discuss in brief. Write a short note on relevancy, admissibility and credibility of evidence.

The Meaning of Relevancy of Facts

At the very foundation of the law of evidence lies a deceptively simple idea — that a court must hear only what matters. This idea is captured in the concept of relevancy of facts, which is the first great organising principle of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) and its successor, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA).

Section 3 of the IEA defines the term "relevant" with characteristic precision: one fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is connected with the other in any of the ways referred to in the provisions of this Act relating to the relevancy of facts. The BSA retains this definition in substance. The critical phrase is "in any of the ways referred to" — it means that relevancy is not left to the subjective assessment of the judge or to pure logic alone. A fact is legally relevant only when it can be brought within the embrace of Sections 6 to 55 of the IEA (Sections 4 to 50 of the BSA). Section 5 of the IEA (Section 4, BSA) then acts as the gateway provision: evidence may be given of facts in issue and of such facts as are hereinafter declared to be relevant — and of no others. Those four last words are, as one eminent author puts it, a very eloquent testimony to legislative intent.

The distinction between logical relevancy and legal relevancy is fundamental. As the process works under English law, a judge first asks whether a fact is logically relevant — whether believing in it would help him decide the matter — and if no rule of exclusion bars it, the fact is admissible. Under Indian law, the process is different. The judge asks: under which section of the Act is this fact relevant? If it cannot be brought within any of the sections relating to relevancy, it is excluded. As Justice Mahmood observed in Queen Empress v Abdullah (1885 ILR 7 All 385), the Evidence Act in effect prohibits the employment of any kind of evidence not specifically authorised by the Act itself. Thus, a fact that is logically relevant may not be legally relevant, and the converse is also possible — a fact legally relevant under the Act may have only a tenuous logical connection to the fact in issue.

The provisions governing relevancy cover seven broad categories: facts connected with the fact in issue (Sections 6–16 of IEA / Sections 4–14 of BSA), admissions and confessions (Sections 17–31 / 15–29), statements by persons who cannot be called as witnesses (Sections 32–33 / 26–27), statements under special circumstances (Sections 34–39 / 28–33), judgments of courts (Sections 40–44 / 34–38), opinions of third persons (Sections 45–51 / 39–45), and character evidence (Sections 52–55 / 46–50).

Opinions of Third Persons: When Relevant

The general rule in the law of evidence is that a witness may testify only to facts within their personal knowledge, not to opinions or inferences. A witness sees, hears, touches — the court draws the conclusions. This is the celebrated opinion exclusion rule. However, the Act carves out specific and well-defined exceptions to this rule under Sections 45 to 51 of the IEA (Sections 39 to 45 of the BSA), under the heading "Opinions of Third Persons When Relevant." The justification for these exceptions is simple: there are areas of specialised knowledge and experience where the court cannot reach an independent conclusion without guidance from persons possessing expertise that ordinary judges do not have.

Expert Opinion (Section 45 IEA / Section 39 BSA)

The most important of these provisions is Section 45 of the IEA, which renders relevant the opinion of experts when the court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, science, art, identity of handwriting, or finger impressions. Such persons are called experts. The illustrations to the section are illuminating — if the question is whether the death of A was caused by poison, the opinions of experts as to the symptoms produced by that poison are relevant. Similarly, if the question is whether a document was written by A, the opinions of experts in handwriting comparison are relevant. The BSA in Section 39 carries this forward without material change.

The leading case on the value and limitations of expert opinion is State of Himachal Pradesh v Jai Lal (AIR 1999 SC 3318), where the Supreme Court held that the opinion of an expert is not conclusive; it is only advisory or assistive. The court is not bound to accept it, and must assess it in light of other evidence. The court further held that expert evidence is a weak type of evidence and that the judge must apply his own judgment to the facts proved by other evidence. This is equally important under Section 39 of the BSA.

The BSA introduces a significant new provision in Section 39A (corresponding to Section 45A of the IEA as amended), which makes the opinion of an Examiner of Electronic Evidence — a designated expert under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 — relevant when the court has to form an opinion on any matter relating to information transmitted or stored in any computer resource or electronic form. This modernises the framework significantly, acknowledging that courts increasingly deal with digital evidence beyond the ken of ordinary knowledge.

Opinion as to Handwriting (Section 47 IEA / Section 41 BSA)

Where the court has to form an opinion as to the person by whom any document was written or signed, the opinion of any person acquainted with the handwriting of that person is relevant. The Explanation to Section 47 clarifies that acquaintance arises when a person has seen the individual write, or has received letters purporting to be written by that person in correspondence, or in the ordinary course of business has had documents by that person habitually submitted to them. The illustration to the section — of a merchant, his clerk, and his broker — captures the breadth of acquaintance contemplated. This is different from expert opinion: the person need not be a handwriting expert, but must have genuine acquaintance.

In R v Titchener, and under Indian jurisprudence in Fakhruddin v State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1967 SC 1326), the courts held that the evidence of a person acquainted with the handwriting is admissible but carries relatively less weight compared to that of a qualified handwriting expert under Section 45.

Opinion as to General Custom or Right (Section 48 IEA / Section 42 BSA)

When the court has to form an opinion as to the existence of any general custom or right, the opinions of persons who would be likely to know of its existence are relevant. The Explanation extends this to customs or rights common to any considerable class of persons. An illustration will suffice: if the right of the villagers of a particular village to use the water of a particular well is in question, those likely to know of the custom — elderly villagers, local officials — may give their opinion.

Opinion as to Usages, Tenets, etc. (Section 49 IEA / Section 43 BSA)

When the court has to form an opinion as to usages and tenets of any body of men or family, the constitution and government of any religious or charitable foundation, or the meaning of words used in particular districts or by particular classes of people, the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge are relevant facts. This provision is especially important in disputes relating to religious endowments, caste usages, trade terminologies, and the interpretation of technical terms in specialised fields.

Opinion on Relationship (Section 50 IEA / Section 44 BSA)

Section 50 provides that when the court has to form an opinion as to the relationship of one person to another, the opinion expressed by conduct of any person who, as a member of the family or otherwise, has special means of knowledge on the subject, is relevant. The Supreme Court in Dalgobinda v Nimai Charan Misra (AIR 1959 SC 914) clarified the meaning of "opinion" in this section: it means something more than mere retailing of gossip or hearsay; it means a judgment or belief resulting from what one thinks on a particular question — and that belief must manifest itself in conduct, not mere words. The section does not make evidence of mere general reputation admissible; it is the outward behaviour, the conduct, that counts. However, the section carries an important proviso: such opinion alone is not sufficient to prove marriage in proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act or in prosecutions for bigamy under the IPC (now BNS), where strict proof of marriage is required.

Grounds of Opinion (Section 51 IEA / Section 45 BSA)

Section 51 of the IEA (Section 45 of BSA) lays down the logical corollary: whenever the opinion of any living person is relevant, the grounds on which that opinion is based are also relevant. An expert, therefore, cannot simply state a conclusion — the court is entitled to know, and the expert is entitled to explain, the experiments, tests, analyses, or reasoning that support the opinion. An expert who gives reasons that are frivolous or inconclusive renders the opinion worthless.

Relevancy, Admissibility, and Credibility: A Short Note

These three concepts — relevancy, admissibility, and credibility — are the three successive filters through which a piece of evidence must pass before it can influence the outcome of a proceeding. They are related but conceptually distinct, and their confusion leads to serious analytical errors.

Relevancy

Relevancy, as discussed, is a legal declaration — a fact is relevant if it falls within Sections 6 to 55 of the IEA (Sections 4 to 50 of BSA). It is the threshold question: should this fact even be considered? A fact relevant under the Act must be given in evidence; it cannot be rejected merely because the judge is not impressed by it. As V.P. Sarathi explains, a fact passes through stages — first logical relevancy, then legal relevancy, then admissibility — and in India the journey begins not with logic but with the statute.

Admissibility

Admissibility is the next question. Even a legally relevant fact may be inadmissible if some rule of exclusion operates against it. The classic illustration is found in Sections 122 to 126 of the IEA — communications during marriage, evidence as to affairs of State, official communications, and professional communications are relevant in the logical sense, but the law bars their proof in the public interest or to protect privileged relationships. As V.P. Sarathi precisely notes: "facts which are relevant may not be admissible, and facts which are admissible may not be relevant."

The converse is also true. Certain facts are admissible even though they are not relevant in the technical sense. Facts going to the impeachment of a witness's credibility under Sections 155 and 146, and former statements used for corroboration under Section 157, are admissible under those provisions even though they do not relate to a fact in issue or a fact declared relevant under Sections 6 to 55. The Supreme Court confirmed this in Ram Bihari Yadav v State of Bihar (AIR 1998 SC 1850): "more often than not, facts which are relevant are not admissible; so also facts which are admissible may not be relevant — for example, questions permitted to be put in cross-examination to test the veracity or impeach the credit of witnesses, though not relevant, are admissible."

Section 136 of the IEA (Section 136 of BSA) confers on the judge the gatekeeping function: when a party proposes to give evidence of any fact, the judge may ask in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant, and shall admit it only if satisfied of its relevance. Admissibility presupposes relevancy — but relevancy alone does not guarantee admissibility.

The distinction carries a critical procedural consequence. Objections to admissibility must ordinarily be raised at the time the evidence is tendered, failing which the objection may be waived. However, objections to the weight or credibility of evidence can be raised at any stage, right up to the final arguments.

Credibility

Credibility is the last and most elusive of the three concepts. Once evidence has cleared the hurdle of relevancy and the bar of admissibility, the question becomes: how much weight should it carry? This is a question of fact to be assessed by the court based on the totality of circumstances — the demeanour of the witness, consistency of the account, corroboration by other evidence, the opportunity of the witness to observe, and the inherent probability of the statement.

Section 3 of the IEA defines "proved" with this in mind: a fact is proved when, after considering the matters before it (not merely the evidence), the court believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man would act upon that supposition. The use of the wider word "matters" rather than "evidence" is deliberate — it allows the court to take into account the demeanour of witnesses, which the bare record of testimony cannot fully capture. As V.P. Sarathi quotes the immortal caution of Alexandre Dumas, a judge should be "a steel probe to search hearts, a touchstone to try the gold which in each soul is mingled with more or less alloy."

The three concepts can be summarised thus:

To crystallise the relationship with a courtroom illustration: A confession made by an accused person under promise of pardon by a police officer is relevant — it is the accused's own admission — but it is inadmissible under Sections 24 and 25 of the IEA (Sections 22 and 23 of BSA) because it was extracted under inducement. Even if a confession is both relevant and admissible, its credibility may be low if it was retracted or contradicted by other evidence. These are three entirely separate enquiries, each governed by its own principles, and no competent advocate or judge should ever conflate them.