What is Restitution of Conjugal Rights? Discuss its constitutional validity.
Restitution of conjugal rights is an old matrimonial remedy, taken from English ecclesiastical law, applied in India under colonial rule, and retained in Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Its constitutionality was contested in the courts in the 1980s.
The Statutory Foundation
Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides that when either the husband or wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply by petition to the District Court for restitution of conjugal rights. The court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution accordingly. The Explanation added by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 places the burden of proving reasonable excuse on the person who has withdrawn from the society of the petitioner.
The phrase "withdrawal from society" means a repudiation of the conjugal relationship as a whole, and not merely living apart because of employment or circumstance. It covers refusal to live together, to maintain marital intercourse, and to give company and comfort. Mere refusal of sexual intercourse while the parties are living together under the same roof does not constitute withdrawal from society, nor does separation necessitated by occupational requirements, so long as the parties meet whenever circumstances permit.
Conditions for the Decree
For a decree of restitution to be granted, four conditions must be satisfied cumulatively.
The respondent has withdrawn from the society of the petitioner
The withdrawal is without reasonable excuse
The court is satisfied as to the truth of the statements in the petition
There is no legal ground why the relief should not be granted
The defence of reasonable excuse is broader than a formal ground for any matrimonial cause. It encompasses any matrimonial misconduct that is grave and weighty, cruelty (even if not establishing a ground for divorce), the husband keeping a concubine, the husband's insistence that a vegetarian wife eat meat, false accusations of unchastity, the husband's addiction to alcohol accompanied by dangerous conduct, a husband suffering from a loathsome communicable disease, or a husband taking a second wife. Courts have also refused restitution where the petition was found to be not bona fide, or was filed with the ulterior motive of gaining possession of the wife's property, or where granting the decree would be neither just, reasonable nor equitable.
The section presupposes a valid subsisting marriage. Where the marriage itself is invalid, whether because the petitioner had a subsisting first marriage, or because the parties were not validly married at all, no decree for restitution can be passed.
The Constitutional Storm: T. Sareetha v. T. Venkatasubbaiah (AIR 1983 AP 356)
The most powerful challenge to Section 9 came from the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Choudary J. declared Section 9 unconstitutional. He reasoned that sexual cohabitation is an inseparable ingredient of a decree of restitution and its enforcement through attachment of property effectively coerces the unwilling party into having sexual intercourse against their free will. He held that the right to privacy, as part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, includes bodily inviolability and the freedom to decide whether and when one's body is used for another's purposes, and that Section 9 violated it. On Article 14 he observed that equal treatment regardless of the inequalities of real life is not justice.
The Counter: Harvinder Kaur v. Harmander Singh (AIR 1984 Del 66)
The Delhi High Court, shortly thereafter, took the opposite view. Avadh Behari Rohatgi J. upheld Section 9 and remarked that introducing constitutional law into the home is "like introducing a bull in a china shop." The learned judge distinguished between cohabitation as consortium, the full conjugal fellowship of husband and wife, and mere sexual intercourse. Restitution, he held, aims at cohabitation and consortium, not specifically at sex. In his view the judgment in T. Sareetha placed too much weight on sex.
Justice Rohatgi further pointed out that Section 9, read with Section 13(1-A), has a useful function: it invites the withdrawing spouse to return and, if the decree is not complied with for one year, supplies a ground for divorce. To strike down Section 9 would affect the divorce ground in Section 13(1-A)(ii) as well.
The Final Word: Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar (AIR 1984 SC 1562)
The Supreme Court settled the controversy in Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan Kumar. The case arose from a petition for divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) after a decree for restitution passed by consent had not been complied with. The question was whether the petitioner was taking advantage of his own wrong under Section 23, or whether the decree was collusive. The Court held that a consent decree is not for that reason collusive, where it follows the court's efforts at reconciliation, and that divorce could not be refused on that ground.
On the constitutional question, the Supreme Court approved the Delhi High Court judgment in Harvinder Kaur and overruled the Andhra Pradesh view. The Court held that the right of a spouse to the society of the other is inherent in the institution of marriage and not merely statutory. Attachment of property under Order XXI Rule 32 is an inducement to the parties to live together, not an instrument of coercion, and Section 9 has sufficient safeguards. It does not violate Articles 14 and 21.
A Lingering Academic Concern
The constitutional question was settled in 1984, but the remedy is criticised because it is mainly used as a step towards divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii): when cohabitation is not resumed for a year after the decree, either party may sue for divorce. Calls to abolish it have grown since the Supreme Court recognised the right to privacy in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India ((2017) 10 SCC 1). Whether Saroj Rani still holds in light of that decision has not been squarely decided.
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