Limitation ActCondonation of Delay 22 June 2026· 6 min read

    What is the scope of Section 5 and does it apply to suits?

    Audio playback is not supported in this browser.

    Section 5 does not apply to suits. The section speaks of "any appeal or any application", and the omission of suits is deliberate. Section 3(1) says that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, subject to sections 4 to 24, and section 5 is not among the sections that relax the rule for suits. In Rikhab Dass v Chandro (AIR 1971 All 234) the Allahabad High Court held that section 3(1) does not extend section 5 to suits, and the Bombay High Court in Union of India v Suresh Jayantilal Thanawala (2000 AIHC 2092) and the Orissa High Court in Baishnab Charan Ray v Debraj Sahoo (AIR 2004 Ori 3) have said the same. The Supreme Court's statement in Ramlal, Motilal and Chotelal v Rewa Coalfields Ltd (AIR 1962 SC 361) is the one usually cited for the contrast: only in the case of appeals and applications has the court been given a discretion to admit a proceeding after the prescribed period, and the discretion is exercisable only if sufficient cause is shown.

    The reason for treating suits differently is not hard to see. A suit starts a claim that has never been before a court, and a defendant who has seen the period pass without any claim has a settled position that the law protects. An appeal or application, on the other hand, is a step in a proceeding already begun, where a litigant who has once approached the court may fail to take the next step through no great fault of his own. Allowing a court to excuse delay in suits would let it revive a dead cause of action, which the Act is designed to prevent. The courts have also said that the inherent power under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be used to condone delay, since that would undo the Limitation Act.

    Within the field of appeals and applications section 5 has its own exclusion. It does not apply to an application under any provision of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, which means that an execution court cannot condone delay in applying for execution. The decree-holder already has a long period, twelve years under Article 136, and the judgment-debtor is entitled to be free of the decree once that period ends. Subject to that exclusion, section 5 reaches every appeal, whether first, second or by special leave, and every application, such as an application to set aside an ex parte decree under Order IX Rule 13, to restore a dismissed suit or appeal, or for review. A revision petition is treated as an application and not an appeal, though nothing turns on the label since section 5 reaches both.

    The section carries one condition of procedure that is easy to overlook. A civil appeal presented after the period must be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit that sets out the facts relied on, under Order XLI Rule 3A(1), and under Rule 3A(2), if the court does not reject the application without notice, notice goes to the respondent and the application is decided before the appeal is taken up. Rule 3A does not require the appeal to be dismissed at once if the application is missing, and the court may give the appellant a chance to file one; but if he does not, the appellate court has both the power and the duty to dismiss the appeal as barred. The courts have also held that an application for condonation must be decided first, and that an appeal decided on merits without deciding the question of limitation cannot stand.

    The effect of special and local laws needs care. Section 29(2) provides that where a special or local law prescribes a period of limitation different from the Schedule, section 3 applies as if that period were prescribed by the Schedule, and sections 4 to 24 apply to the extent they are not expressly excluded by the special or local law. Section 5 therefore applies to appeals and applications under special laws unless the law excludes it. It is not enough to look for an express reference to section 5. The Supreme Court has held that the scheme of a special law can exclude it by necessary implication. In Hukumdev Narain Yadav v Lalit Narain Mishra ((1974) 2 SCC 133 : AIR 1974 SC 480) it held that the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is a complete code, so sections 4 and 5 do not apply to election petitions. In Union of India v Popular Construction Co ((2001) 8 SCC 470 : AIR 2001 SC 4010) the Court held that section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which allows a further thirty days on sufficient cause "but not thereafter", excludes section 5, and Simplex Infrastructure Ltd v Union of India (AIR 2019 SC 505) is cited for the same position. The Orissa High Court dealt with the application of section 5 where a special law is silent in Union of India v Ashok Kumar Saboo (AIR 2014 Ori 46). The decisions on which special laws exclude section 5 are scattered and some conflict, and the position under some statutes, the Payment of Wages Act among them, cannot be put down as settled either way. In Mary D'Souza v Land Acquisition Officer (AIR 1992 Kant 331) the Karnataka High Court held that section 5 could not be invoked to extend the time for a reference application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. That Act has been replaced by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and the decision is of historical interest only. An appeal under section 54 of the old Act was an appeal against a decree governed by the Code and was open to section 5 (Collector, Varanasi v Rai Prem Chand, AIR 1992 All 206).

    The last point of scope is the Explanation, which applies to appeals and applications and not to suits. It treats a litigant misled by an order, practice or judgment of the High Court in computing the period as having sufficient cause, which recognises that the court's own conduct can cause the default. In summary, section 5 is a power given to the court in respect of appeals and applications other than those under Order XXI, it depends on the applicant satisfying the court, it can be excluded by a special law expressly or by its scheme, and it has no application to a suit, however sympathetic the case.

    For an illustration, suppose A lends B money on 10 June 2022. Article 19 gives three years from the date of the loan, so the suit must be filed by 10 June 2025. If A files on 12 August 2025, saying that he was short of money and that his lawyer advised him wrongly, section 5 is of no help to him. The court will dismiss the suit under section 3, and neither poverty nor bad advice alters that.

    Share:WhatsAppXLinkedIn

    Get weekly legal insights

    Case-law digests, exam tips & curated study guides — straight to your inbox.

    No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.