When can a suit be filed in multiple jurisdictions?

The Default Rule and Its Significance

Before examining where multiple courts may have jurisdiction, one must appreciate the default rule in Section 15: every suit must be filed in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. This principle shapes everything that follows. The provisions on territorial jurisdiction do not operate in a vacuum — they must always be read alongside this grading rule. Even when two or more courts have concurrent territorial jurisdiction, the plaintiff must still choose the one that is of the lowest competent grade.

Immovable Property in Different Jurisdictions: Section 17

The clearest and most practically significant instance of concurrent jurisdiction arises under Section 17, which deals with immovable property situated within the jurisdiction of different courts. Where the relief claimed relates to such property — whether for recovery, partition, mortgage, or compensation for wrong — the plaintiff may institute the suit in the court within whose local limits any portion of the property lies, provided the entire claim falls within that court's pecuniary jurisdiction.

The object of this provision, as the commentary clearly emphasises, is to avoid multiplicity of suits. Without it, a plaintiff who held a mortgage over two properties in two different districts would be compelled to file two separate suits — an obvious inconvenience and an unnecessary burden on the courts. Section 17 allows one suit to embrace all the properties, wherever situated. The Supreme Court affirmed this in Madhao Deshpande v. Madhav Dharmadhikaree (AIR 1988 SC 1347), holding that where properties in different jurisdictions were the subject of an arbitration dispute, the court within whose jurisdiction even one property lay had jurisdiction to entertain the award.

The section is, however, subject to an important qualification: it applies only where there is one cause of action underlying the claim for all the properties. As the Supreme Court held in Illuri Subbayya Chetty v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1964 SC 322), if the cause of action as to property in one district is different from the cause of action as to property in another, the section has no application and separate suits are needed. The principle is one of unity — a single cause of action may travel with the plaintiff to any court where any part of the property lies, but separate and independent causes of action cannot be stitched together under the cover of Section 17.

Uncertainty as to Jurisdiction: Section 18

Life on the ground rarely presents itself in clean, map-like boundaries. Section 18 addresses the situation where it is genuinely uncertain within the local limits of which of two or more courts an immovable property is situate. In such cases, any one of those courts may, after recording a statement that the uncertainty is genuine, proceed to entertain and dispose of the suit. The decree it passes has the same effect as if the property were clearly within its jurisdiction.

This provision ensures that a genuine boundary uncertainty does not become a trap for the litigant. The courts have noted that the kind of uncertainty the Legislature had in mind was primarily physical uncertainty — the sort caused by fluvial action or the absence of a clear boundary notification. What it does not permit is a manufactured uncertainty designed to choose a preferred court.

Suits for Torts to Person or Movables: Section 19

Section 19 creates a deliberate concurrent jurisdiction in a different category of suits — those for compensation for wrong done to the person or to movable property. Where the wrong was committed within the jurisdiction of one court and the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within the jurisdiction of another court, the plaintiff may choose either court.

The two illustrations attached to the section make this vivid: if A, residing in Delhi, beats B in Calcutta, B may sue A either in Calcutta where the wrong occurred, or in Delhi where A resides. The plaintiff's option is absolute as between these two courts. The section reflects a deliberate legislative balancing act — the plaintiff is the victim and deserves some convenience; the defendant, who has wronged another, is not entitled to insist that the plaintiff travel to the defendant's residence to seek redress.

Personal Suits Under Section 20: The Widest Choice

For all suits not falling under Sections 16 to 19 — principally suits arising from contract and other personal obligations — Section 20 provides what is often described as the widest concurrent jurisdiction. A suit may be filed in any court within whose jurisdiction the defendant actually and voluntarily resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain, or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The words "wholly or in part" are of enormous practical significance — they mean that even if only a fragment of the cause of action arose within a court's territory, that fragment suffices to found territorial jurisdiction.

The illustrations to Section 20 demonstrate this concurrence beautifully. Where a promissory note is made at Banaras and the defendant resides at Agra, the plaintiff may sue at either Banaras or Agra. Where two defendants reside in different cities and the cause of action arose in a third city, the plaintiff may choose any one of three courts — subject to the leave requirement when non-resident defendants are involved.

However, this wide concurrent jurisdiction comes with a significant judicial counterweight. The Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2014 SC 3519) directed that courts should endeavour to locate the place where the cause of action has substantially arisen, and cautioned against allowing a trifling or tenuous connection to justify filing in a distant forum. Additionally, where a defendant corporation has a subordinate office in the place where the cause of action arises, the suit must be brought in that court alone, regardless of the wider choices Section 20 might otherwise offer.

Multiple Defendants in Different Jurisdictions

A particularly common situation of multiple jurisdiction arises when there are multiple defendants residing in different places. Section 20(b) expressly permits the suit to be filed in the court within whose local limits any one of the defendants resides or carries on business — subject to the important rider that either the court's leave is obtained or the non-resident defendants acquiesce in the institution of the suit at that place. Without leave or acquiescence, the suit cannot proceed against the non-resident defendants. This is not a defect of jurisdiction in the technical sense, but it is a procedural safeguard that protects the non-resident defendant from being dragged into a court of someone else's choosing.

The Proviso to Section 16: Relief Obtainable Through Personal Obedience

There is one further situation of multiple jurisdiction that deserves particular attention — the proviso to Section 16. As a general rule, suits relating to immovable property must be filed in the court within whose jurisdiction the property lies. But the proviso carves out an exception rooted in the equity maxim actio in personam: where the property is held by or on behalf of the defendant, and the relief sought can be entirely obtained through the personal obedience of the defendant, the suit may be instituted either in the court where the property lies, or in the court within whose jurisdiction the defendant actually resides, carries on business, or personally works for gain. This creates a genuine concurrent choice — the plaintiff may sue where the land is, or where the person is, provided the relief is truly personal in nature.

The Unifying Principle

Reading Sections 16 to 20 together, one sees a consistent design: the law creates concurrent jurisdiction wherever there is more than one legitimate connecting factor between the dispute and a forum. Property in different districts, defendants in different cities, wrongs committed in one place and defendants residing in another — in each case, the Code recognises that no single forum has an exclusive claim and gives the plaintiff a choice. But the choice is never unlimited, never self-creating, and never a licence for forum shopping. Every instance of concurrent jurisdiction carries with it the duty to choose honestly — and the doctrine of forum conveniens, together with the court's supervisory power of transfer, stands as a check on any abuse of the latitude that the law of place of suing extends to every plaintiff.