Code of Civil ProcedureInterim Relief 21 May 2026· 5 min read

    When can ex parte interim orders be passed?

    Audio playback is not supported in this browser.

    The grant of an ex parte interim order — an order made without notice to, or in the absence of, the party against whom it operates — represents one of the most drastic exercises of a civil court's power. It is a departure from one of the most fundamental principles of civil justice: audi alteram partem, the rule that no person shall be adversely affected by a court's order without being given an opportunity to be heard. For this reason, the circumstances in which ex parte interim orders may be granted are strictly regulated by Order XXXIX, Rules 3, 3A, and 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the courts have consistently held that this power must be exercised with exceptional caution and never as a matter of routine.

    The General Rule: Notice Is Mandatory

    Rule 3 of Order XXXIX lays down the governing principle in clear and unambiguous terms: the court shall, in all cases, before granting an injunction, direct notice of the application to be given to the opposite party. The rule uses the word "shall" — a word of command, not discretion. Notice to the opposite party is therefore not a procedural courtesy; it is a legal obligation cast upon the court. The underlying logic is that equitable relief is never granted in a vacuum. Before the court restrains a party or compels him to act, the court owes it to that party — and to the integrity of the judicial process — to hear what he has to say.

    Courts have repeatedly underscored that this requirement of notice is not a technicality. In JA Taban v. Khairul Nisa (AIR 1970 Del 205), the Delhi High Court held that when the opposite party appears before the court, notice must invariably be given before any interim order is passed. The appearance of the opposite party before the court makes the case for ex parte relief entirely untenable — if the party is present, there is no reason not to hear him.

    The Exception: When Notice Would Defeat the Object

    The legislature has recognised one, and only one, ground on which this mandatory requirement of notice may be displaced: where it appears to the court that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by the delay involved in issuing notice. This exception is contained in the proviso to Rule 3 itself. The reasoning is intelligible in practice: if the very act of notifying the defendant will give him the opportunity to do the mischief that the plaintiff seeks to prevent — to alienate the property, to remove assets, to destroy evidence — then insisting on prior notice would make the injunction remedy meaningless.

    The exception is, however, a narrow one. It is not enough for the applicant to allege that notice would cause delay; all litigation involves delay. The court must be affirmatively satisfied that the particular delay in issuing notice in that particular case would actually defeat the object of granting the injunction. The rule is not a licence for bypassing notice whenever a party wishes to obtain an injunction quickly. As courts have repeatedly observed, granting a temporary injunction mechanically — without real judicial consideration of whether notice would defeat the object — is an error of jurisdiction.

    The Mandatory Requirements for an Ex Parte Order

    When the court decides that a case of exceptional urgency exists and that notice would defeat the object, the proviso to Rule 3 imposes a set of mandatory procedural safeguards on the exercise of the ex parte power. These safeguards are not optional conditions; the language of the proviso is mandatory and must be strictly complied with.

    First, the court must record reasons in writing for its opinion that the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. A bald, conclusory order granting an ex parte injunction without recording reasons is bad in law. The Supreme Court, in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira (AIR 2012 SC 1727), reminded courts that they must carefully examine the entire pleadings and documents with the utmost care and seriousness before passing an ex parte ad interim order. Where grave urgency necessitates such an order, it should be granted for a specified period — such as two weeks — so that the injunction does not remain hanging indefinitely without an inter partes hearing. The recording of reasons is the court's way of demonstrating that it has actually applied its mind to the exceptional circumstance and has not acted mechanically.

    Second, the applicant is required to deliver to the opposite party, immediately after the ex parte order is passed, a copy of the following documents: the application for injunction;

    • the affidavit filed in support of the application; the plaint; and

    • copies of all documents upon which the applicant relies.

    This delivery must be made either in person or by registered post. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that although the order was made without prior notice, the defendant is brought to knowledge of it at the earliest opportunity after it is made. The ex parte character of the order does not mean that the defendant may be kept in the dark indefinitely.

    Third, the applicant must file an affidavit before the court, on the same day or the next day, confirming that the copies have been duly delivered or sent to the opposite party. This affidavit is a document of accountability — it creates a record that the applicant has complied with the communication requirement, and it gives the court a mechanism to verify compliance.

    A party who obtains an ex parte injunction and takes advantage of it without complying with these requirements of communication and affidavit cannot be said to be dealing fairly with either the court or the opposite party.

    The Thirty-Day Imperative: Rule 3A

    The 1976 Amendment inserted Rule 3A into Order XXXIX, reflecting a clear legislative recognition that ex parte injunctions were being prolonged indefinitely — parties were exploiting the interlocutory advantage to delay the hearing of the injunction application itself. Rule 3A provides that where an injunction has been granted without notice to the opposite party, the court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted.

    Where it is unable to do so within thirty days, the court must record its reasons for such inability. This is not a mere administrative direction — courts have held that where an ex parte injunction has been extended beyond thirty days without reasons being recorded, the extension itself is bad in law. In Ratna Commercial Enterprises Ltd v. Vasutech Ltd (AIR 2008 Del 99 DB), the Delhi High Court held that where the application for vacation of an ex parte injunction was not disposed of within thirty days, the affected party is entitled to prefer an appeal. Where an ex parte injunction is extended time and again without recording reasons, with the applicant exploiting the pendency of the matter to delay final hearing, courts have held that such repeated extension results in a miscarriage of justice.

    Importantly, Rule 3A does not make the ex parte order ipso facto illegal merely because the court fails to restrict it to a period of thirty days at the time of its initial grant. The obligation is on the court to finally dispose of the injunction application — not to restrict the duration of the order in the first instance — within thirty days.

    Consequences of a False Statement: Rule 4

    Rule 4 of Order XXXIX governs the discharge, variation, and setting aside of injunction orders. A particularly significant safeguard in the context of ex parte orders is the first proviso to Rule 4: where the court finds that the applicant has, in the application or supporting affidavit, knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to any material particular, and the injunction was granted without notice, the court shall vacate the injunction.

    The use of the word "shall" is again significant — it is mandatory. The court has no discretion to maintain the injunction once a knowing false or misleading statement on a material point is established, except where the court is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded, that it is necessary in the interests of justice not to vacate it. This provision goes to the root of the duty of candour that a party appearing ex parte owes to the court. When the defendant has had no opportunity to place his version before the court, the applicant becomes the sole source of information before the court, and the law demands that this information be truthful. An applicant who abuses the ex parte procedure by misrepresenting material facts forfeits the benefit of the order obtained.

    No Ex Parte Relief for Public Projects

    One important exclusion laid down by the courts is that ex parte injunctions or stay orders should not be granted against public projects, economic policies, or schemes of the government. The reasoning is that such orders, however temporary, can have consequences of enormous public consequence — delaying infrastructure, disrupting policy implementation, affecting public interest — and those consequences cannot be undone merely by vacating the order later. The public dimension of such matters requires that the government should always be heard before any interim relief is granted against a public project.

    The Role of the Court's Discretion

    Even where the conditions for an ex parte order are technically satisfied, the grant of such an order remains an exercise of discretionary equitable jurisdiction. The court must still be satisfied that a prima facie case exists and that the balance of convenience favours granting the injunction. No amount of urgency justifies a court in granting an ex parte order in favour of a party who has failed to make out even a prima facie case. The discretion is described as unfettered in its nature, but it must always be guided by the purpose of preventing injustice — not of conferring a tactical advantage on one litigant at the expense of another who has had no opportunity to be heard. As the courts have consistently reminded us, the ex parte procedure is a tool of last resort in the armoury of civil justice, not a shortcut to be routinely deployed whenever urgency is pleaded.

    Share:WhatsAppXLinkedIn

    Get weekly legal insights

    Case-law digests, exam tips & curated study guides — straight to your inbox.

    No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.