When Culpable Homicide Amounts to Murder

Culpable homicide amounts to murder when the act which causes death not only satisfies the general definition of culpable homicide (Section 299 IPC / Section 100 BNS) but also fits into any one of the four aggravated situations set out in Section 300 IPC, now reproduced in Section 101 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. In such a case, and in the absence of any of the five Exceptions, the law labels the offence as murder and prescribes the higher punishment of death or life imprisonment.

Statutory foundation: IPC and BNS

Both the IPC and the BNS follow the same three‑step structure. Section 299 IPC corresponds to Section 100 BNS and defines culpable homicide as causing death by an act done with: intention to cause death; intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

Section 300 IPC, now Section 101 BNS, then takes this generic offence and says: “Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if…” and lays down four clauses (a) to (d). The Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya described culpable homicide as the genus and murder as its gravest species: all murder is culpable homicide, but not all culpable homicide is murder.

For punishment, Section 302 IPC corresponds to Section 103 BNS (murder), and Section 304 IPC to Section 105 BNS (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). BNS has substantially carried forward the IPC text with minor drafting rearrangements and some changes in sentencing structure.

When culpable homicide becomes murder

Under Section 300 IPC / Section 101 BNS, culpable homicide amounts to murder if the case falls under any one of the following four clauses and none of the five Exceptions applies.

1. Intention to cause death (Clause “Firstly” / Section 101(a) BNS)

Culpable homicide is murder if the act causing death is done with the intention of causing death. This simply reproduces the first limb of Section 299 and tells us that whenever there is a direct intention to kill, the offence is murder unless rescued by an Exception.

Illustration (a) to Section 101 BNS makes it clear: A shoots Z with the intention of killing him; Z dies in consequence; A commits murder. In Rawalpenta Venkalu v. State of Hyderabad, the accused set fire to the victim’s house after intoxicating him so that escape was impossible; the Court held that there was a clear intention to cause death and the offence squarely fell within this clause.

The distinction between culpable homicide and murder does not arise here: once intention to cause death is proved and no Exception applies, the case is always murder.

2. Intention to cause a fatal injury to a specially vulnerable person (Clause “Secondly” / Section 101(b) BNS)

The second clause covers cases where:

• The offender intends to cause bodily injury to the victim; and

• He knows that, because of some special condition of that victim (disease, age, infirmity), that particular injury is likely to cause death, even though the same injury would not ordinarily be fatal to a healthy person.

Section 101(b) BNS expressly says that culpable homicide is murder if the act is done “with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused”. Illustration (b) shows A striking Z, who suffers from a disease, with a blow that is likely to cause Z’s death precisely because of that disease; A is guilty of murder even though such a blow would not kill a sound person.

Punnayya explains that this clause is the aggravated counterpart of Section 100(b) BNS (Section 299(b) IPC). Under Section 100(b), the injury intended is merely “likely to cause death”; under Section 101(b), the offender knows that in the case of this particular victim it is likely to be fatal. The law thus punishes exploitation of a known vulnerability as murder.

3. Intention to cause an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death (Clause “Thirdly” / Section 101(c) BNS)

The third clause is the heart of the law on murder. It provides that culpable homicide is murder if:

• The act is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person; and

• The bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Here, the law does not insist on a proven desire to kill. It is enough that the accused intentionally inflicts a bodily injury which, judged objectively, is of such a nature that, in the ordinary course of nature, death would be its most probable result. Illustration (c) to Section 101 BNS is explicit: A intentionally gives Z a sword‑cut or club‑wound sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; Z dies; A is guilty of murder, “although he may not have intended to cause Z’s death”.

This clause has been fully dissected in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab. The accused thrust a spear into the abdomen of the deceased; the intestines protruded; the doctor testified that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The Supreme Court laid down a four‑step test for the application of Clause Thirdly:

1. Objectively establish that a bodily injury is present.

2. Prove the nature of that injury.

3. Prove that the accused intended to inflict that very injury – that it was neither accidental nor unintended. This is the sole subjective element.

4. Prove, on an objective medical‑legal appraisal, that the injury so intended and inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

Once these four elements are satisfied, the offence is murder under Clause Thirdly, even if the accused did not subjectively want the victim to die. The Court rejected the argument that the accused must also intend that the injury be of a fatal degree; intention is confined to causing that particular injury, not to predicting its medical consequences.

In Anda v. State of Rajasthan and Rayavarapu Punnayya, the Court further clarified that “bodily injury” in this clause includes multiple injuries taken together. If all the injuries intentionally inflicted are, cumulatively, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the case is murder under Clause Thirdly, even if no single injury alone is fatal.

Typical examples are:

• A drives a knife straight into B’s chest, piercing the heart; medically, such a wound is sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death; the offence is murder under this clause.

• In Punnayya, the accused repeatedly beat the victim’s arms and legs with sticks; although no blow struck the head or chest, the cumulative injuries were opined to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; the Court treated it as murder under Clause Thirdly.

4. Knowledge of an imminently dangerous act, without excuse (Clause “Fourthly” / Section 101(d) BNS)

Under the fourth clause, culpable homicide is murder when:

• The person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; and

• He commits such act without any excuse for incurring that risk.

Here, there need be no intention to kill or to injure a particular person; the gravamen is the undertaking of an extremely high risk of death to human life without justification. Illustration (d) in Section 101 BNS captures the idea: firing a loaded cannon into a crowd without excuse, resulting in one death, is murder.

Punnayya explains that this clause is the aggravated counterpart of Section 100(c) BNS, which covers cases where the act is merely “likely to cause death”. Where the knowledge rises to a belief that death is practically certain or “must, in all probability” occur, and there is no lawful excuse, the law steps the liability up from culpable homicide to murder.

Modern hooch tragedy and similar cases illustrate Clause Fourthly well: in State of Haryana v. Krishan, adulteration of liquor with methyl alcohol, sold to large numbers of people, resulting in multiple deaths and permanent blindness, was treated as murder because the act of mixing a highly toxic substance in drink intended for human consumption is so imminently dangerous that death is a highly probable result, and there is no excuse of any kind.

Illustrations linking Section 100 and Section 101 (IPC / BNS)

It is useful to see, in simple examples, how culpable homicide under Section 100 BNS becomes murder under Section 101:

1. Simple stabbing in the heart

   • A, enraged with B, thrusts a knife into B’s heart intending to kill him. B dies.

   • This is culpable homicide under Section 100(a) BNS (intention to cause death) and also murder under Section 101(a) (intention to cause death). No Exception applies; the offence is murder punishable under Section 103 BNS.

2. Blow to a diseased person (Clause Second)

   • A knows that Z has a dangerously weak heart. A gives Z a hard punch in the chest, intending only to cause bodily pain, but knowing that such a blow is likely to cause Z’s death in his condition. Z dies.

   • This falls within Section 100(b) BNS (intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death) and, because of A’s special knowledge, within Section 101(b) – the injury is one which A knows is likely to cause Z’s death. The culpable homicide therefore amounts to murder.

3. Virsa Singh‑type injury (Clause Third)

   • A intentionally drives a spear into B’s abdomen; the doctor deposes that the wound is sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death.

   • The act plainly falls within Section 100(b) BNS and, applying the Virsa Singh four‑part test, within Section 101(c). It is thus culpable homicide amounting to murder.

4. Multiple injuries cumulatively fatal (Punnayya)

   • Several accused confine themselves to beating C on arms and legs; medical evidence shows 19 injuries, 9 grievous, and opines that the injuries, taken together, are sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. C dies.

   • Even though no vital organ is struck, the intentional infliction of numerous injuries that are cumulatively sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death brings the case within Clause Thirdly; it is murder.

5. Imminently dangerous acts (Clause Fourth)

   • A places explosive material on the railway tracks and detonates it as a passenger train passes; deaths occur.

   • A clearly knew that his act was so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such injury as is likely to cause death, and he had no excuse for incurring that risk; this is murder under Clause Fourthly.

6. Contrast: mere likelihood of death – culpable homicide only

   • A, in the course of a quarrel, hits B once on the head with a stick. Medical evidence says the injury was “likely to cause death” but not “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”.

   • This is culpable homicide under Section 100(b) BNS (intention to cause bodily injury likely to cause death), but it does not reach Clause Thirdly because the injury is not “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”. In the absence of intention to kill or special knowledge, the offence will normally fall under Section 105 BNS, not Section 103.

Degrees of culpable homicide and exam‑friendly structure

The Supreme Court in Punnayya has given an extremely practical framework, now equally applicable under BNS:

• First degree culpable homicide – Murder

  • This is culpable homicide amounting to murder, defined in Section 300 IPC / Section 101 BNS and punishable by Section 302 IPC / Section 103 BNS.

  • It arises whenever the act falls under any one of the four clauses of Section 101 and is not covered by any Exception.

• Second degree culpable homicide

  • This is culpable homicide not amounting to murder where there is intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, but the case falls under any of the five Exceptions to Section 101 or never reaches the higher thresholds of Section 101 at all.

  • Punishable under the first part of Section 105 BNS (formerly Section 304 Part I IPC), with life imprisonment or imprisonment of not less than five years, extendable to ten, plus fine.

• Third degree culpable homicide

  • This is culpable homicide based only on knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, with no intention to cause death or dangerous injury. It corresponds to Section 100(c) BNS (Section 299(c) IPC) and is punishable under the second part of Section 105 BNS (formerly Section 304 Part II IPC) with up to ten years and fine.