Limitation ActLegal Disability 26 June 2026· 4 min read

    Where a person entitled to institute a suit is a minor or insane or idiot, when will the prescribed period of limitation begin to commence? Give illustrations.

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    The question can mislead if it is taken to mean that the Schedule's starting point is moved. It is not. The starting point stays where the third column of the Schedule puts it, which is the date of the accrual of the cause of action or the other event that the article names. What section 6(1) does is to give the person under disability the right to sue "within the same period after the disability has ceased" as would otherwise have been allowed from that starting point. So the practical answer is that the claimant's period is counted from the cessation of the disability, not from the accrual of the cause of action, provided he was under the disability on the date from which the period is to be reckoned. The day on which the disability ceases is excluded under section 12(1), so counting begins on the next day.

    The rule needs three qualifications. The first is the one imposed by section 8: the extension cannot run for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected. So the person under disability sues within the longer of the remaining ordinary period and the capped extension, and where the article gives a period shorter than three years, he gets that shorter period and not three years. The second is that the benefit exists only if the disability was present at the starting date. If the claimant was of full age and sound mind when the cause of action arose, section 9 applies and nothing that happens later stops time. The third is that the person has to be in existence at the starting date, either born or in the womb; a person born after time has begun to run takes no benefit under section 6 in his own right.

    A few illustrations bring this out. In the first, C, a minor of eight, is dispossessed of his land on 1 April 2012 by a stranger claiming adversely. The ordinary period is twelve years under Article 65, but the question of the extension does not arise, because C attains majority at eighteen in 2022, well before the ordinary period ends in 2024. Section 6 adds nothing, since the ordinary period is the longer. (The Supreme Court's order excluding 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 would push the ordinary last day somewhat later; it does not alter the result.)

    In the second, D is born on 5 May 1996 and a debt falls due to him on 20 August 2004, when he is eight. The suit is governed by a three-year article, so the ordinary period ends on 20 August 2007. D attains majority on 5 May 2014 and may sue until 5 May 2017. Nothing is left of the ordinary period, so D relies on section 6, and the three years after majority are also what section 8 allows.

    In the third, E is of unsound mind from before 1 February 2015, when a debt falls due to him, and recovers his sanity on 10 July 2016. A three-year article applies. The ordinary period would end on 1 February 2018, but E, who was under disability when the period was to be reckoned, may sue within three years after 10 July 2016, that is until 10 July 2019, which is also within the cap in section 8.

    In the fourth, F, a minor of sixteen, becomes of unsound mind before attaining majority. Section 6(2) applies. The disabilities are successive, and F gets the same period after both have ceased, counting from the later cessation, again subject to the three-year limit on the extension.

    In the fifth, G is of full age and sound mind on the day his cause of action arises, and falls into mental illness three months later. Time started against him and is not stopped. Section 9 governs, and G has no relief under section 6. He gets no help from section 6, and section 5 does not apply to suits.

    The prescribed period does begin at the usual point in the Schedule; what the disabled person gets is a right to sue within the same period after his disability ends, capped by section 8 so far as the extension is concerned, and available only if the disability existed at the date from which the period is reckoned.

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