Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability stops it." Explain in brief.
Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963 states this rule in the very words quoted. The sense of it is simple. Limitation is reckoned from a fixed moment, the date from which the period is to be reckoned according to the Schedule. If the claimant is under a legal disability at that moment, section 6 gives him an extension. But once the period has begun, nothing that happens to the claimant afterwards, whether his insanity, his illness, the death of the person entitled and the minority of his heir, can stop the period or interrupt it. Disability is relevant only at the beginning.
The reason is certainty. If every later misfortune could suspend limitation, no claim could ever be treated as dead, and defendants would carry the risk of old claims indefinitely. The section also keeps the system consistent with section 6: a disability that existed at the start earns an extension, and one that arrives later does not. The rule applies to suits and to applications for execution alike, and the courts have held, for example, that the minority of a decree-holder's heir does not stop time running on the decree.
There is one express exception in the proviso. If letters of administration to a creditor's estate are granted to his debtor, the period for a suit to recover the debt is suspended while the administration continues. Other provisions of the Act that exclude time, such as section 15 on stay and injunction, or section 17 on fraud and mistake, work under their own terms.
For example, if a debt falls due to A on 1 September 2023 and he goes out of his mind on 1 June 2024, the three-year period still ends on 1 September 2026, and his guardian must sue by then.
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