Limitation ActMiscellaneous Provisions 06 July 2026· 3 min read

    Whether the Limitation Act, 1962 applies to a proceeding under Article 32 and 226 of the Constitution?

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    The Limitation Act prescribes periods for suits, appeals and applications. A petition under Article 32 or Article 226 is none of these in the sense in which the Schedule uses those words, and no article of the Schedule fixes a time for filing a writ petition. The position is therefore that the Act does not directly apply to the constitutional remedies, but the courts do not ignore delay, and the Act is not wholly irrelevant to them.

    The principle has been stated in this way. The provisions of the Act, and the rules of limitation generally, do not apply to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227, though a court may borrow from them, in the exercise of its discretion, as a guide. There is no period of limitation fixed by any law for a writ petition, and it is doubtful whether one could be prescribed; neither the High Court by its rules nor by practice may lay down a rigid period. What the court asks in each case is whether the petitioner has been guilty of laches, and that depends on the facts. A short delay may be fatal where the rights of others have intervened, and a long delay may be excused where there is a satisfactory reason and no prejudice. The reason is that the writ jurisdiction is discretionary, and relief may be refused to a person who has slept over his rights or who has by his silence let others change their position.

    The Supreme Court has used the periods in the Act as a measure of reasonable time. In State of Madhya Pradesh v Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, a Constitution Bench held that a High Court could, under Article 226, order the refund of tax collected without authority of law and paid under a mistake, but the Court pointed out that the relief was subject to limitation. The Limitation Act does not apply of its own force to a writ petition, but a court will ordinarily refuse a refund of money where the period for a suit for the same relief has expired, and will be slower to refuse where the petition is filed within that period. The period of a civil suit has thus become a standard of reasonable promptness in money claims, although it is only a guide.

    The Act becomes relevant in two further situations. The first arises where a special or local law applies the Act, so that by section 29(2) sections 4 to 24 operate unless the special law excludes them. The second arises with proceedings which follow a writ petition. An appeal from the judgment of a single Judge in a writ matter, or from an order made in connected proceedings, is subject to the period provided for that appeal, and delay in filing it must be explained in the ordinary way. Section 5 and the other provisions that apply to appeals may then be of use to the appellant; they do not help the writ petitioner, whose petition is not an appeal or an application under the Act.

    Two illustrations may be given. An employee who challenges an order of termination by a writ petition filed many years later, giving no reason for the delay, may be told that he is guilty of laches although no article of the Schedule bars him. A person who obtains an order from the single Judge and wishes to appeal must file within the time the law allows for the appeal, and must explain any delay beyond it.

    The correct position is that the Limitation Act does not govern the filing of writ petitions under Articles 32 and 226. It is nonetheless true that unreasonable delay may defeat the petition, and that the Act governs related appeals and proceedings where the Act or a special statute says so. The distinction is between a statutory bar, which operates mechanically, and laches, which is a matter for judicial discretion.

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