Which section of the Limitation Act lays down the doctrine of the "effect of acknowledgment"? What are the broad principles & requirements for invoking this doctrine?
The doctrine is laid down in section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is headed "Effect of acknowledgment in writing". It works alongside section 19, which deals with payment on account of a debt, and section 20, which says who can acknowledge or pay on behalf of another. The reasoning behind it is simple. A person who admits in writing, while the creditor's remedy is still alive, that he owes something has given the creditor a reason to wait. The statute therefore lets the creditor count his time again from the date of the admission.
Sub-section (1) reads: "Where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property or right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by any person through whom he derives his title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed." The section is not confined to money debts. It speaks of "property or right", and it applies as much to a claim to redeem a mortgage or to recover possession as to a claim for a loan.
The Supreme Court has summed up what a party must show in order to invoke it. There must be an acknowledgment of liability in respect of the property or right claimed. It must be in writing and signed by the party against whom the claim is made, or by someone through whom that party derives his title or liability. And it must be made before the prescribed period has expired (State of Kerala v T.M. Chacko, AIR 2000 SC 3597 : (2000) 9 SCC 722). The rest of the law is an elaboration of these three requirements.
On the first, the courts have said consistently what an acknowledgment is. It is an admission of one's own liability, and the admission may be express or implied. The statement must relate to a liability that exists at the time it is made. It must show the legal relationship between the parties, such as that of debtor and creditor, and it must appear that the writer meant to admit that relationship (Khan Bahadur Shapoor Fredoom Mazda v Durga Prosad Chamaria, AIR 1961 SC 1236 : [1962] 1 SCR 140). The intention need not be put into words and may be gathered from the nature of the admission and the surrounding circumstances. Courts read such documents generously, but they do not manufacture an admission that is not there, and they do not fasten an intention on the writer by a far-fetched chain of reasoning. A bare statement of a relationship, made without any intention of admitting it, is not enough (Tilak Ram v Nathu, AIR 1967 SC 935). A mere reference to a past debt is not enough either: the Supreme Court has held that an admission of a liability that has already ended does not count (Valliamma Champaka Pillai v Sivathanu Pillai, AIR 1979 SC 1937 : (1979) 4 SCC 429).
The section is also generous in what it does not demand. Explanation (a) says an acknowledgment is sufficient even though it leaves out the exact nature of the property or right, or says that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit enjoyment, or is coupled with a claim to set-off, or is addressed to some person other than the person entitled. There is no need for a promise to pay, and the letter need not be addressed to the creditor.
On the second requirement, writing and signature, Explanation (b) says that "signed" means signed personally or by a duly authorised agent. Section 20(1) adds that for a person under disability the agent includes his lawful guardian, committee or manager, or an agent authorised by them. Oral evidence has a limited place. If the document is undated, the time at which it was signed may be proved by oral evidence, but the contents may not be proved orally, subject to the Evidence Act.
On the third requirement, timing, the acknowledgment must come while the creditor's remedy is still alive. One made after the period has expired does not revive the claim. In Sampuran Singh v Niranjan Kaur, AIR 1999 SC 1047 : (1999) 2 SCC 679, a written acknowledgment of a mortgage dated 1960 could not help a suit for redemption whose period had already run out. A revival of a time-barred debt, if it is to occur at all, has to come from a fresh promise under section 25(3) of the Contract Act, and that is a different doctrine with different conditions.
Two further points complete the picture. Explanation (c) says that an application for execution of a decree or order is not an application in respect of any property or right, so section 18 does not assist in execution. And a party who relies on an acknowledgment must plead it, because the court is bound by section 3 to dismiss a time-barred suit whether or not the defendant raises the objection, and an acknowledgment that has not been pleaded cannot be relied upon at the trial.
In short, section 18 asks three things of the creditor: a written and signed admission of a subsisting liability, made by the right person, within time. If he has them, his period is counted afresh from the date of the signature.
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