Write a critical essay on Relationship between Fundamental Right and Directive Principles.
The Constitution places the Fundamental Rights in Part III, enforceable in the courts, and the Directive Principles in Part IV, which are not. How the two parts relate has been a matter of constant difficulty, and the judicial view has moved from separation to integration and, in some cases, to the primacy of the Directive Principles.
Origins of the difficulty. The Constituent Assembly arranged the interests between the two Parts through compromise. The right to primary education, which was important to the framers, was moved from Part III to Part IV and became unenforceable, whereas the right to equality before law, which had been in Part IV, was moved to Part III. Some proposed directives, such as one providing that marriage should be based on mutual consent, were dropped. This picking and choosing has made the relationship between the two Parts ambiguous. Dr Rau had initially proposed to protect laws that promoted directives against the Fundamental Rights, and K T Shah wanted a time limit within which all the directives should be made justiciable.
First phase: rights prevail. In State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226, a government order that violated Article 29(2) was held invalid although it was made to give effect to Article 46. The Court held that the Directive Principles, which Article 37 makes unenforceable, cannot override the Fundamental Rights, which are enforceable under Article 32, and that the Directive Principles must conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights. Otherwise the rights would be reduced to "a mere rope of sand".
Second phase: harmony. The Court then started to attach value to the Directive Principles. It said that in interpreting a statute they offer a lodestar, and where two judicial choices are available the one in conformity with the Directive Principles is to be preferred. In Re Kerala Education Bill, AIR 1958 SC 956, Das CJ affirmed the primacy of the Fundamental Rights but said that, in determining their scope, the Court should not entirely ignore the Directive Principles and should apply harmonious construction to give effect to both as far as possible.
Third phase: integration and expansion. In due course it became a judicial strategy to read the Fundamental Rights together with the Directive Principles. The Directive Principles have been used to broaden the Fundamental Rights, and the values underlying them have become enforceable, so to say, by riding on the back of the rights. The biggest beneficiary has been Article 21. Read with the Directive Principles it has produced the right to live with human dignity (Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802), the right to a pollution-free environment, the right to health, the right to shelter and the right to education. The Directive Principles are also an index of public purpose, as in State of Bihar v Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, where the abolition of zamindari was held to be for a public purpose with the help of Article 39. A restriction that promotes a directive is treated as reasonable under Article 19, as in Laxmi Khandsari v State of UP, and the Wealth Tax Act was upheld in the light of Article 39(c). Article 14 read with Article 39(d) gave the principle of equal pay for equal work.
The amendments. Article 31C, added by the Twenty-fifth Amendment, gave primacy to Articles 39(b) and (c) over the rights in Articles 14, 19 and 31. The Court upheld the amendment in Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461, and Mathew J went the furthest in saying that in building up a just social order it is sometimes imperative that the rights be subordinated to the Directive Principles. The Forty-second Amendment then extended this primacy to all the Directive Principles. In Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789 : (1980) 3 SCC 625, the Court struck down that extension. Chandrachud CJ held that the Fundamental Rights are not an end in themselves but a means to an end, that the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles together form the core of the commitment to social revolution and are the conscience of the Constitution, and that the harmony and balance between them is an essential feature of the basic structure. Giving absolute primacy to one over the other would disturb it. Bhagwati J, in a partly dissenting opinion, argued strongly that the Directive Principles should not be seen as subordinate to the rights.
Critical comment. The present position, which is of balance, is sound as a matter of principle, but it leaves several matters open. The effect of Minerva Mills on Article 31C is itself disputed: on a broad reading Article 31C fell in its entirety, and on a narrow reading it was restored to its form after Kesavananda. The method of reading the Directive Principles into the rights has widened the rights, but it has also meant that the principles are enforced only when they can be attached to a fundamental right, which leaves the principles that cannot be so attached, such as those on village panchayats or the organisation of agriculture, largely to the political process. Some, like Seervai, have thought that if the Directive Principles had not been enacted nothing would have happened, whereas if the rights had not been enacted the result would have been a disaster; others, like Bhagwati J, Krishna Iyer J and Ramaswamy J, have taken the view that the Directive Principles are superior. Neither extreme represents the law, which is one of mutual support.
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