Constitutional LawProtection against Arrest and Detention 29 July 2026· 16 min read

    Write a short essay on constitutional protection against Preventive Detention as granted under Article 22.

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    Preventive detention means detention without trial and conviction. It is different in kind from imprisonment after a trial. A convicted person is punished for something he has done, and the offence must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. A preventive detenu is held because the executive is satisfied that he may do something harmful in future, and his past conduct is only the material from which that future conduct is inferred. As the Supreme Court put it in State of Tamil Nadu v Senthil Kumar, AIR 1999 SC 971, punitive incarceration follows a trial on the allegations made, whereas preventive detention is without any trial of those allegations. Britain, the United States and Canada have used such detention only in wartime, but the Indian Constitution itself contemplates a law of preventive detention in peacetime. The Constitution therefore authorises it, and Article 22(4) to (7) then places safeguards around it. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that this is a drastic power, to be used with caution and never as an alternative to the ordinary criminal law.

    Who may make the law. Parliament has exclusive power to legislate for reasons connected with defence, foreign affairs and the security of India (Entry 9, List I). Parliament and the State legislatures can both legislate for reasons relating to the security of a State, the maintenance of public order and the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community (Entry 3, List III). Parliament has also used its residuary power. The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) was enacted on that footing read with Entry 36 of List I, although it has been argued that using the residuary power to widen a field the Constitution has deliberately limited is open to doubt. The Supreme Court upheld COFEPOSA as relatable to Entry 3 of List III. In Attorney General for India v Amratlal Prajivandas, AIR 1994 SC 2179, it read the expression "security of the State" broadly, observing that a State with a weak economy is vulnerable, so that economic strength is as much a part of security as armed strength.

    The safeguards are part of every detention law. Clauses (4) to (7) of Article 22 are minimum procedural safeguards. If a law or an executive action infringes them, the detention is invalid. It makes no difference whether the statute repeats them, because they are superimposed on it by the Constitution. A detention law must also satisfy Articles 19 and 21.

    Communication of grounds (Article 22(5)). The clause has two parts. The authority must communicate the grounds "as soon as may be", and it must afford the detenu the "earliest opportunity" of making a representation. The courts have treated both as expressions of natural justice and have read them generously.

    The grounds mean more than a bare conclusion. They include the basic facts and materials on which the conclusion rests. Khudiram Das v State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 550, is the leading illustration. Three incidents were given to the detenu as grounds, but the District Magistrate also had the detenu's history-sheet before him, and none of its contents had been communicated. The Magistrate stated on affidavit that he had not taken the history-sheet into account, and the State asked the Court to accept that statement. The Supreme Court refused. As the guardian of Fundamental Rights, it said, the Court must itself examine what material could have influenced the Magistrate, and for that purpose it can call for the whole record. If damaging material with a bearing on the object of detention was before him at about the time of the order, the Court may infer that it influenced him, because the human mind does not work in compartments. Everything that weighed with the authority must therefore be given to the detenu, and failure to do so makes the detention invalid. In the same line, Prakash Chandra Mehta v Commissioner and Secretary, Government of Kerala, AIR 1986 SC 687, which arose under COFEPOSA, held that "grounds" covers the basic facts as well as the conclusions drawn from them. Sophia Gulam Mohd Bhan v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1999 SC 3051, added that the documents relied on must be supplied to the detenu, in a language he understands, and quashed a COFEPOSA detention because documents considered by the detaining authority had not been given. In Icchu Devi v Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1983, the Court released a detenu under the same Act because copies of documents relied on in the grounds had not been supplied, and it spoke with real concern for personal liberty. The Court has, however, also said in Kamarunissa v Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1640, that it is not enough to show that some document was not given; the detenu must show that the omission impaired his ability to make an effective representation.

    Two further points follow from the words "as soon as may be". Delay in furnishing the grounds, if not reasonably explained, vitiates the detention, and the statutes often fix an outer limit. Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA, for example, requires the grounds to be communicated ordinarily within five days, and in exceptional circumstances, for reasons recorded in writing, within fifteen. The grounds must also be given all at once. Fresh grounds cannot be added later to strengthen the order, because either they existed when the order was made, in which case they should have been communicated at once, or they did not, in which case they could not have influenced the authority. The authority may, however, supply further facts or particulars to explain the grounds already given, provided it does so within a reasonable time.

    Clause (6) qualifies all this by allowing the authority to withhold facts that it considers it against the public interest to disclose. The distinction drawn is between "facts" and "grounds": facts may be withheld, but every ground must be disclosed. The authority alone decides what to withhold, and it need not tell the detenu what it has withheld. The detenu is entitled to the material on which the order rests, not to the identity of confidential informants.

    The right to make a representation. A representation is meaningful only if the grounds are clear. The courts have therefore held that grounds which are vague or lacking in particulars infringe the right, and that the detenu is entitled to release in such a case. A ground is not vague if it can be understood and is definite enough to be answered. In an early case where the grounds identified the time and place of certain speeches but not the offending passages, the Court by a majority held the particulars sufficient, though the minority thought that at least the gist of the speeches should have been given. Later decisions have taken a stricter view. Describing a person as being of "desperate habits and dangerous character" has been held vague, and so have grounds written in terms that a layman could not understand without a lawyer. Grounds supplied in a language the detenu does not know do not amount to communication, since communication means bringing effective knowledge of the facts home to him. Even one vague ground among several can invalidate the detention. To get around this, section 5A of the National Security Act and of COFEPOSA provides that an order made on several grounds is deemed to be made separately on each, so that it survives if one ground fails; this has been described as a serious inroad into judicial review.

    Consideration of the representation. Article 22(5) does not say to whom the representation is made or what is to be done with it. The Supreme Court has filled the gap. The right to make a representation includes the right to have it properly considered, and it is "not a mere formality". The government must consider the representation itself, and it is not enough to forward it to the Advisory Board. There are thus two distinct obligations: to consider the representation quickly, and to refer the case to the Board. A representation made by a lawyer on behalf of the detenu must be considered, and where the order was passed by the Home Minister a rejection by the Secretary was held to be without jurisdiction. In Rajammal v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1999 SC 684, the Court said that the test is not how long the delay was, but whether the authority has explained it. An unexplained delay of five days was fatal, and the statement that the Minister was on tour was not accepted as an explanation where liberty under Article 21 was at stake. The Court has refused to lay down a fixed period, but it has said that delay caused by negligence, callous inaction or red tape will vitiate the continued detention, even if the order was valid when made. Even after the Board has upheld the detention, the government must still consider the representation, because it is not bound by the Board's opinion if that opinion is against the detenu. In Gracy v State of Kerala, AIR 1991 SC 1090, the Court held that the government's duty to consider the representation is independent of the Board's consideration of it, and its breach made the continued detention illegal. More recently, in Ankit Ashok Jalan v Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 127, the Court held that where a representation is made to the officer who passed the order under COFEPOSA, he too must consider it without waiting for the Board's report. The Court has also held that the outcome of the representation should be communicated to the detenu. Union of India v Saleena, (2016) 3 SCC 437, took the view that the order rejecting a representation need not itself be communicated, but a three-judge Bench in Sarabjeet Singh Mokha v District Magistrate, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1019, confined that decision to its facts and required the authority to communicate its decision.

    The Advisory Board (Article 22(4)). A law may authorise detention for up to three months without reference to a Board. Beyond that, the detention is valid only if the Board has reported, before the three months end, that there is sufficient cause for it. The government must also confirm and extend the detention within that period, after applying its mind to the Board's report and the record, and the confirmation should be in writing and communicated, though failure to communicate it is only an irregularity. Where the statute gives the detenu a right to be heard by the Board, denying the hearing invalidates the detention. The Board's opinion is confidential and merely assists the government; it binds the government only if it is in favour of the detenu. The three months in clause (4)(a) relate to the initial period of detention, until the Board's report is received. They do not limit the total period for which the detenu may be held after confirmation, and a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court has said so after an earlier decision had taken the opposite view.

    The Forty-fourth Amendment, 1978, tried to strengthen these provisions. It would have reduced the period without a Board from three months to two, required the Board to have a serving High Court Judge as Chairman, and made the Board's composition depend on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the High Court. These changes have not been brought into force, and the earlier text continues to apply.

    Dispensing with the Board (Article 22(7)). Under clause (7)(a) Parliament may prescribe "the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which" a person may be detained for more than three months without a Board. In A K Gopalan, the Supreme Court by a majority read the word "and" disjunctively, so that either would do. This was overruled in Sambhu Nath Sarkar v State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 1425. Section 17A of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act simply took five of the six heads of legislative power as the circumstances in which no Board was necessary. The Court struck it down. It reasoned that clause (4)(a), under which a Board must normally review any detention beyond three months, is the general rule, and clause (7)(a) is an exception that should be confined to exceptional cases; if Parliament could dispense with the Board by repeating the entries of the legislative lists, the general rule would be nullified. Parliament must therefore apply its mind and prescribe both specific circumstances and a specific class of cases. Only Parliament, not a State legislature, can do this. Section 9 of COFEPOSA is an example of a provision of this kind, allowing detention beyond three months, up to six, without a Board in specified cases. Clause (7)(b), which authorises Parliament to fix a maximum period, is permissive, and the maximum may be fixed by reference to an event, such as the end of an Emergency, rather than in days or months (Fulchand Shah v Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1023).

    The National Security Act and vagueness. The constitutional validity of the National Security Act, 1980 came before the Supreme Court in A K Roy v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710. The Court rejected the argument that preventive detention is impermissible under the Constitution. It was also argued that expressions such as "security of a State" and "public order", lifted from the legislative entries, were so vague that the Act gave uncontrolled discretion. The Court accepted that vagueness bears on the reasonableness of a law affecting liberty, but held that these concepts, though difficult to define precisely, can be applied to practical situations. It added a warning: undefined concepts must be given a narrower meaning than the words literally suggest, and the Act must be applied in as few situations as possible. It found the expression "maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community" too vague, since it did not say which supplies and services were essential, but instead of striking it down it directed that no one may be detained under that clause unless the supplies and services in question have been made known to the public in advance by law, order or notification. It also upheld the power given to district magistrates and police commissioners, in view of the safeguards in section 3(4) and (5). In State of Maharashtra v Sushila Mafatlal Shah, AIR 1988 SC 2090, it was held that an order passed by an officer specially empowered is the order of the Government, so the detenu makes his representation to the appropriate Government and not to that officer.

    What the courts examine. A detention law need not lay down an objective standard, since the satisfaction required is the satisfaction of the executive, and the court does not substitute its own assessment. The test is relevancy and not sufficiency of the grounds. The courts do review the order on well-recognised heads. The order can be quashed for mala fides, as where it was found that a police officer had made false reports to remove a kerosene dealer from the market in favour of relatives. It can be quashed for non-application of mind, as where the authority did not know that the detenu's bail application had been rejected (Abdul Razak Abdul Wahab Sheikh v S N Sinha, AIR 1989 SC 2265), and where a material fact was not considered. It can be quashed if there is no rational material on which a reasonable person could have been satisfied, or if the grounds are non-existent or irrelevant. If one of several grounds is bad, the whole order fails, because it cannot be known how far the bad ground weighed with the authority, subject to section 5A mentioned above.

    The courts also look for a "live and proximate link" between the past conduct and the need to detain. In Sama Aruna v State of Telangana, (2018) 12 SCC 150, incidents nine to fourteen years old could not support a detention, because detention must rest on a reasonable prediction of future behaviour and is meant to prevent, not to punish. A long gap of two or three months between the order and the arrest has been held to cast doubt on the genuineness of the satisfaction. A single incident may or may not suffice. A solitary act of wagon-breaking or a simple theft has been held insufficient, whereas an organised armed robbery may show a potential for continuing criminality.

    A person already in custody can be detained, as the Court explained in Kamarunissa, if the authority is aware that he is in custody, has reliable material showing a real possibility of his release on bail and that he would then in all probability engage in prejudicial activity, and considers detention essential to prevent it. Such an order cannot be struck down merely because the authority could have opposed bail.

    Public order. Detention for the maintenance of public order requires more than a breach of the law. In Ram Manohar Lohia v State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740, the Court described three concentric circles: "law and order" is the widest, "public order" lies within it, and "security of the State" is the smallest. An act may disturb law and order without disturbing public order. In Sushanta Goswami v State of West Bengal, AIR 1969 SC 1004, the Court said that any breach of law affects order, but it affects public order only if it affects the community or the public at large. Whether an act does so depends on its nature, the place where it is committed and its significance. Ordinary theft, a solitary assault or a murderous assault on one person concerns law and order; highway robbery with daggers, firing in public or possession of high explosives concerns public order. The Supreme Court has recently refused to allow a State's law against "goondas" to be used on the "drop of a hat" for stray acts affecting private individuals.

    The Court's role. Judicial review of preventive detention is therefore limited but real. The burden of showing that the detention is according to the procedure established by law lies on the detaining authority, because of Article 21. As early as 1949, in A K Gopalan v District Magistrate of Malabar, K Subba Rao J of the Madras High Court said that it is the duty of the Court to see that no citizen, rich or poor, is illegally detained for even a minute. In Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v State of Maharashtra, (2021) 2 SCC 427, the Supreme Court repeated that the courts must remain the first line of defence of liberty and that the deprivation of liberty for even a single day is one day too many. Finally, a person cannot ordinarily challenge a detention order before it is served on him. A writ court will interfere at that stage only in exceptional circumstances.

    The result is a framework in which the executive has an extraordinary power, but one that is bounded by time, by notice and disclosure, by a duty to consider the representation promptly, by an Advisory Board and by judicial review.

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