Constitutional LawAmendment of the Constitution 06 August 2026· 4 min read

    Write note on Article 368 and the Supreme Court of India.

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    Article 368 contains both the procedure for amending the Constitution and, since the Twenty-fourth Amendment, the express statement of Parliament's power to do so. The Supreme Court has been called on again and again to say how far the power extends, and its decisions have shaped Article 368 more than any text.

    The text. An amendment may be initiated only by a Bill in either House of Parliament. It must be passed by a majority of the total membership of each House and two-thirds of the members present and voting, and, for the entrenched provisions, ratified by half the State Legislatures, after which the President must assent. The Twenty-fourth Amendment altered the marginal note, added a clause stating that Parliament may amend "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution", added that Article 13 does not apply to amendments under Article 368, and made Presidential assent compulsory. The Forty-second Amendment added clauses (4) and (5), which were struck down in Minerva Mills.

    The Court's role. In Sankari Prasad and Sajjan Singh the Court read Article 368 literally, so that it covered all provisions. In Golak Nath, by six to five, the Court read Article 368 as providing only procedure and held that Fundamental Rights could not be amended under it. The Court moved to a middle course in Kesavananda Bharati (AIR 1973 SC 1461), where it held that Article 368 itself contains the power, which extends to the Fundamental Rights, but that the "basic structure" cannot be altered. Indira Nehru Gandhi (AIR 1975 SC 2299) applied the doctrine to strike down clause 4 of the Thirty-ninth Amendment. Minerva Mills (AIR 1980 SC 1789) struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368, holding that Parliament cannot, using a limited power, enlarge it into an absolute one. Waman Rao v UOI, AIR 1981 SC 271 upheld the Maharashtra ceiling law and Article 31A, and, as IR Coelho later read it, left amendments made on or after 24 April 1973 open to challenge. IR Coelho (AIR 2007 SC 861) held that Ninth Schedule laws inserted after that date may be challenged on the basis of the basic structure. Nagaraj ((2006) 8 SCC 212) added the width test and the test of identity.

    Waman Rao and Coelho. Waman Rao v Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271, upheld the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 and Article 31A, and was later read as meaning that amendments made on or after 24 April 1973, the date of Kesavananda Bharati, remain open to challenge on the basis of the basic structure. This was confirmed by a bench of nine judges in IR Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861, which arose out of the Thirty-fourth Amendment's placing of the Gudalur Janmam Estates Act in the Ninth Schedule after the Act had been struck down as outside Article 31A. The Court held that Parliament can amend Part III, but subject to the basic structure, and that each amendment must be judged on its actual effect on the rights. Article 31B does not give unlimited power to place laws in the Ninth Schedule after 24 April 1973; such laws can be tested against Article 21 read with Articles 14, 15 and 19 and their underlying principles. Overriding the whole of Part III by Article 31B would defeat basic features such as secularism, the separation of powers, equality and judicial review. The Court also said that the Fundamental Rights do not come in isolated pools, since together they give a comprehensive guarantee against excesses by the State.

    A K Roy v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 710, dealt with the power to bring a constitutional amendment into force by notification. It has been argued that the dissenting view was sounder, because the power to notify is in substance a constituent power which Parliament should not delegate.

    Assessment. The role the Court has assumed has been defended on the ground that Parliamentary supremacy in practice means the supremacy of the government of the day, and that the unbroken dominance of one party at the Centre made some check necessary. It is also open to criticism, since the Court has not defined the basic structure and no text authorises it. The Court's approach was seen as vindicated by the Thirty-ninth and Forty-second Amendments, which showed that an unlimited amending power could be misused.

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