Write shorts note on Directive Principles of State Policy and their constitutional importance.
Part IV of the Constitution, in Articles 36 to 51, contains the Directive Principles of State Policy. They are instructions to the legislatures and the governments on the kind of society that the State is to work for. Their roots lie in the Karachi Resolution of 1931 and in the socialist and nationalist currents of the preceding years, and the framers were also influenced by post-war European constitutions and by the Directive Principles of Social Policy in the Irish Constitution.
The principles. The Directive Principles require the State to promote a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, informs all national institutions (Article 38); to secure an adequate means of livelihood, a fair distribution of material resources and the avoidance of concentration of wealth, equal pay for equal work, and the protection of children and workers (Article 39); to provide free legal aid (Article 39A); to organise village panchayats (Article 40); to make provision for public assistance in unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement (Article 41); to secure just and humane conditions of work, a living wage and workers' participation in management (Articles 42, 43 and 43A); to promote co-operative societies; to strive for a uniform civil code (Article 44); to provide for education (Article 45); to promote the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections (Article 46); to raise the level of nutrition and standard of living and improve public health, including prohibition of intoxicating drinks (Article 47); to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern lines (Article 48); to protect the environment (Article 48A) and monuments (Article 49); to separate the judiciary from the executive (Article 50); and to promote international peace (Article 51).
Nature. Article 37 states that the provisions of this Part are not enforceable by any court, but that the principles laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country and that it is the duty of the State to apply them in making laws. They therefore have a character of their own. They are not rights that an individual can claim in court, but they are legal and constitutional directions to the State, and they have been recognised as part of the basic structure. They are drafted in flexible and general language, so they do not impose a particular socio-economic philosophy on the country and leave room for governments of different outlooks to frame policy.
Importance. The Preamble promises justice, social, economic and political. The Directive Principles reinforce it by spelling out the goal of economic democracy and the welfare State. Dr Ambedkar's view in the Constituent Assembly was that the party in power would have to answer for them before the electorate, and Munshi thought that they would be the basis of protest against arbitrary legislation. In practice they have inspired planning, the restructuring of agrarian relations, the extension of the public sector and the regulation of private enterprise. The Courts use them to interpret statutes: where two constructions are possible, the one that conforms to the Directive Principles is preferred. They have been used to decide whether a restriction on a Fundamental Right is reasonable, and to give content to rights such as the right to life under Article 21.
Judicial treatment. The courts have given the Directive Principles practical effect in several ways. In State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan, AIR 1951 SC 226, the Court held that the Directive Principles must conform to and run as subsidiary to the Fundamental Rights, and this was the position until the Twenty-fifth Amendment introduced Article 31C. The Court has read Article 39(b) widely. In State of Karnataka v Ranganatha Reddy, AIR 1978 SC 215, it said that "material resources of the community" embraces all the national wealth and everything of value or use in the material world, private as well as public. In Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Co v Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, AIR 1983 SC 239, the Court upheld the nationalisation of coking coal mines, holding that the expression covers resources owned by individuals as well as by the community, natural and man-made, and that nationalisation is itself a distributive process. In Randhir Singh v Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 879, equal pay for equal work, which is expressed in Article 39(d), was derived by reading Articles 14 and 16 in its light, although it is not declared a Fundamental Right in terms. Article 39A has been held to be intrinsic to Article 21: free legal services are an essential part of a fair, just and reasonable procedure for a person accused of an offence who cannot afford a lawyer.
The largest effect has come through Article 21. Rights that began as non-justiciable directives have been enforced as part of the right to life, including the right to pollution-free water and air (Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420), the right to shelter (Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame, AIR 1990 SC 630), the rehabilitation of bonded labourers (Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 802), and the maintenance of public health (Vincent Panikurlangara v Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 990). The right to education shows the process. In Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 1858, the Court held that the right to education flows directly from the right to life. In Unni Krishnan J P v State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 2178, the Court partly overruled that decision, holding that the right is implicit in Article 21 read with Articles 41, 45 and 46, but that every citizen has a right to free education only until the age of fourteen, and beyond it the right depends on the economic capacity of the State. Parliament then inserted Article 21A by the Eighty-sixth Amendment, providing free and compulsory education for children from six to fourteen years, and made it a Fundamental Duty of parents to provide opportunities for education.
The relationship with the Fundamental Rights was finally settled in Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789. The Forty-second Amendment had extended Article 31C to protect a law made to give effect to any Directive Principle from challenge under Articles 14 and 19. The majority struck the extension down. It held that the Constitution is founded on a balance between Parts III and IV, and that giving either absolute primacy over the other would destroy the basic structure. As a result Article 31C protects only laws made to implement Article 39(b) and (c).
Limits. The Principles guide the exercise of legislative power but do not control it. They do not confer legislative competence on a legislature that does not otherwise have it; competence is decided by the three Lists. The implementation of the principles has also fallen short, and a surfeit of laws has been matched by weak administration of them.
In short, the Directive Principles are the Constitution's statement of the social and economic aims of the State. They are not enforced by the courts, but they bind the State morally and constitutionally and shape the interpretation of the Fundamental Rights.
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