X, a landlady inducted Y as tenant on monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/- per month for two years from 1992. After expiry, tenant continued to occupy and paid rent till 1996. In 1996, X was transferred to Chennai and Y stopped paying rent. No correspondence till 2011. In 2011, X sent legal notice terminating tenancy. Y contends he has become owner by adverse possession for fourteen years without paying rent. Decide.
Y's claim fails. A tenant's possession is by the leave of the landlord and is not hostile to her, and neither the lapse of time nor the failure to pay rent changes this unless the tenant plainly denies the landlord's title and the landlord comes to know of it. Nothing of that kind is stated here, so Y has not become an owner, and X's suit for possession following her notice of 2011 is within time.
The first step is to see what the relationship between the parties was throughout. The lease was for two years from 1992, and it ended by efflux of time in 1994. Y, however, stayed on, and X went on accepting rent until 1996. Under section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, where a lessee remains in possession after the end of the term and the lessor accepts rent, the lease is renewed from year to year or from month to month, according to the purpose for which the property was let. Here the rent was fixed monthly, and the likely result is a month-to-month tenancy. Such a tenancy does not come to an end by itself, and under section 106 it is determined only by a notice from either side. X's failure to receive rent after 1996 did not end the tenancy, and neither did her absence in Chennai. The tenancy therefore remained in existence until X gave notice in 2011, and during all that time Y held as a tenant.
The effect on limitation is governed by Article 67, which gives a landlord twelve years to sue a tenant for possession, running from the time when the tenancy is determined. The article puts the beginning of time at the end of the tenancy and not at the end of payment of rent, because until the tenancy has ended the landlord has no right to possession that she could enforce. A suit filed after the notice of 2011 had expired would thus be well within the twelve years. The reasoning also answers Y's point of adverse possession directly. The period of twelve years in Article 65, on which Y has to rely, starts when the defendant's possession becomes adverse, and a tenant's possession during the tenancy cannot be adverse to his landlord. In Atyam Veerraju v Pechetti Venkanna, AIR 1966 SC 629 : [1966] 1 SCR 831, the Supreme Court held that a tenant who had not been shown to repudiate the tenancy to the landlord's knowledge was not in adverse possession during the tenancy, that the landlord's suit was governed by the article for recovery of possession from the determination of the tenancy, and so the suit was in time. This accords with the general principle that possession which is referable to a lawful title does not become adverse merely because it is long. A tenant is also barred by the law of evidence from challenging his landlord's title while the tenancy lasts; the rule is found in section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and now in section 122 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which has been in force since 1 July 2024.
Non-payment of rent is the whole of Y's case, and it is not enough. A tenant who defaults commits a breach of his obligation. He does not thereby claim the property as his own, and the landlord's remedy is to sue for arrears and to end the tenancy. For adverse possession there must be something more, namely a clear assertion of a right hostile to the landlord, such as a denial of her title or a claim to ownership, which is brought home to her so that she is put on notice and could sue. In Thakur Kishan Singh v Arvind Kumar, (1994) 6 SCC 591 : AIR 1995 SC 73, the Court stated that possession which began with permission does not become adverse unless it is shown that the person in possession later asserted a hostile title, and the burden of showing it falls on him. In this case there is no evidence of any such act: no letter, no repudiation, no claim in any record. The silence from 1996 to 2011 is that of a landlord who did not press her rights and a tenant who stayed on, which is consistent with the continuation of the tenancy. It is true that the landlord is lax, but laxity during a tenancy does not shorten her time for suing, since time does not run at all until the tenancy is determined.
The fourteen years on which Y relies need one further comment. Even if the matter were looked at from 1996, the year in which the rent stopped, twelve years would have been completed in 2008, and Y's argument would have been strong had his possession been hostile from that year. It was not. Y cannot select the year in which he stopped paying and call it the year in which he began to hold as owner, since his intention in 1996 has to be proved, and the only proved fact is that he failed to pay.
The result is that Y's plea of adverse possession is rejected. His holding was that of a monthly tenant, whose tenancy was determined by X's notice in 2011, and X may sue for possession within twelve years of that determination. She may also claim arrears of rent, subject to the period allowed for such a claim, and compensation for use and occupation after the tenancy ended. If Y had in fact gone further, for example by openly denying X's title in 1996 and claiming to be the owner in a way that she knew about, the position would be different, and the question would then be whether twelve years had passed from that act. Because the facts disclose no such act, the case turns on the tenancy and not on adverse possession.
Get weekly legal insights
Case-law digests, exam tips & curated study guides — straight to your inbox.
No spam. Unsubscribe anytime.
