Section 153A IPC: Class Conflict vs. Hate Speech Analysis

The Provision: Section 153A IPC and Section 196 BNS

Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 punishes whoever, by words, spoken or written, or by signs or visible representations, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community, or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities. The punishment is imprisonment up to three years, or fine, or both. If the offence is committed in a place of worship, the punishment is enhanced to five years.

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 preserves this provision under Section 196 BNS, with no notable change in substance. It adds electronic communication as an additional mode of commission, in tune with the present age, but the fundamental architecture of the offence remains unchanged. The section punishes three distinct kinds of conduct: (a) promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between groups, (b) committing acts prejudicial to harmony which disturb or are likely to disturb public tranquillity, and (c) organising activities to train persons to use criminal force against any such group.

The Essential Ingredients

To attract Section 153A IPC (or Section 196 BNS), the following elements must be established:

An act committed by words, written or spoken, signs, or visible representations
That the act promotes or attempts to promote disharmony, enmity, hatred or ill-will
The promotion must be between different groups — religious, racial, language, regional, or any other ground
The act must be likely to disturb public tranquillity

One ingredient deserves special emphasis, because the courts have consistently insisted upon it: the intention of the writer or publisher matters enormously. Liability under Section 153A attaches not merely to the thing said, but primarily to the manner in which it is said and the purpose with which it is expressed. A court must read the impugned writing as a whole, in context, and with the eyes of an ordinarily reasonable and prudent reader, before concluding that the provision is attracted.

The Critical Judicial Test: Political Writing vs. Hate Speech

The most important judicial pronouncement on the precise question that this problem raises comes from the Allahabad High Court in Shiv Kumar Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1978 Cr LJ 701). In that case, the court was confronted with writings that called upon the poor masses to rebel against the capitalist class. The court held that where the views expressed in an article are purely political in nature, Section 153A is not attracted, even though the writing calls upon the poor masses to rebel against the capitalist class. This single judicial observation is the turning point of our analysis.

The reason for this approach is intellectually sound. Section 153A was enacted to protect the social fabric of Indian society from the poison of communal, sectarian, and class hatred deliberately injected by provocative writing or speech. It was not designed to suppress political commentary, economic critique, or reportage of social grievances — activities that are the lifeblood of a democracy and the daily business of the press. The separation of political analysis from hate-mongering is therefore the central task the courts must perform.

Analysis of the Article in X Times

Now we turn to the article itself. What does it actually contain?

It alleges that B and the Chief Minister conspired to acquire farmland for an SEZ
It alleges that B's henchmen burned houses and standing crops of farmers to prevent legal challenges
It alleges that B's promise of local employment was false and that workers from the Chief Minister's constituency would be employed instead

Reading the article as a whole, it is essentially a political and economic exposé. It accuses a capitalist (B) of colluding with a state functionary (the Chief Minister) to exploit farmers, suppress their resistance through violence, and deny them economic benefits. It is a narrative about the alleged abuse of state power in favour of capital at the expense of agrarian labour — a theme as old as organised political thought in India.

The two groups that the article juxtaposes are the capitalist class and the labour/farming class. This raises the question squarely: can class conflict — economic and political in nature — attract the provision? As the Allahabad High Court held in Shiv Kumar Mishra's case, purely political views calling upon the poor masses to rebel against the capitalist class do not attract Section 153A. Class — understood in its socio-economic sense — is different from the identities protected by the provision: religion, race, language, region, caste, or community.

The "Any Other Ground" Clause: Does Economic Class Qualify?

It is true that Section 153A uses the expansive phrase "any other ground whatsoever" after listing the specific categories. One might argue that this extends the provision to economic class distinctions. However, the principle of ejusdem generis — which requires that general words following specific words be understood as belonging to the same genus as the specific words — counsels restraint. The specific categories — religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste, community — all relate to inherited, immutable, or deeply rooted identity markers. Economic class, by contrast, is a functional, fluid, and politically defined category. Courts have not extended the provision to purely economic class-based writing, and the Shiv Kumar Mishra decision is direct authority that they should not.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the article does not promote hatred against capitalists or labourers as groups. It makes specific, factual allegations against named individuals — B and the Chief Minister. The Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1997 SC 3483) ruling of the Supreme Court laid down an important principle: the promotion of enmity must be between two identifiable groups, and the impugned writing must have the tendency to make one group hate another. A writing that makes allegations against specific named persons — even powerful ones — is not the same as one that promotes one community to hate another.

The Manner of Expression: Tone and Language

One must also consider the manner and tone of the article. The courts have repeatedly said that a fair, reasoned, even vehement critique does not attract Section 153A if it is couched in language that, however forceful, does not deliberately incite one group to develop hatred toward another. In Azizul Haq Kausar Naquvi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1980 All 149), the Allahabad High Court held that if words are couched in temperate, dignified language and do not tend to insult the feelings or the deepest convictions of any section of the people, Section 153A is not attracted.

The article in X Times alleges corruption, exploitation, and violence. It is an accusation — perhaps a defamatory one — against specific individuals. But there is nothing in the description of this article to suggest that it calls upon labourers to attack capitalists, or that it seeks to make one economic class hate another in the visceral, inciting sense that Section 153A targets.

What Offence Might Actually Be Attracted?

The more appropriate provisions to examine are:

Section 499/500 IPC (Defamation — Section 356 BNS): If the allegations against B and the Chief Minister are false and injure their reputation, a defamation complaint would be more apt. The editor, printer and publisher of a newspaper are all persons who may be charged with defamation.
Section 124A IPC (Section 152 BNS on Sedition/Acts against State integrity): This too would not apply here, as the article does not aim at subverting the state or exciting hatred against the government as an institution.

Opinion: Can the Editor, Printer and Publisher Be Charged?

Having analysed the provision, the judicial interpretations, and the content of the article, the considered legal opinion is this:

The editor, printer and publisher of X Times cannot be successfully charged under Section 153A IPC (or Section 196 BNS) on the basis of the article described. The reasons are:

The article expresses views that are purely political and economic in nature — an allegation of conspiracy between capital and political power against farmers. Such writing, as the Allahabad High Court held in Shiv Kumar Mishra's case, does not attract Section 153A even if it calls upon the poor masses to rebel against the capitalist class.
The groups portrayed — capitalists and labour class — are economic categories, not the kinds of identity-based groups contemplated by the provision.
The article makes specific factual allegations against named individuals, not a generalised promotion of hatred of one class against another.
The manner of expression — an exposé of alleged political and corporate wrongdoing — is in the tradition of responsible investigative journalism, not inflammatory incitement.
The purpose of the article, on its face, appears to be to inform and criticise — which is the core function of the press in a democracy. As the courts have held, the law under Section 153A is not meant to gag the press from reporting on conflicts between social and economic groups.

However, one caveat must be entered. If the writing were to be read not merely as a political exposé but as a deliberate attempt to use the language of class conflict to incite violence — if it contained calls to physical action, or used language calculated to trigger a violent response from labourers against capitalists — then the position might shift. But on the facts as stated, no such element is present. The article reports alleged wrongdoing; it does not inflame passions toward violent confrontation between classes.