Can a person recover possession of immovable property if he was dispossessed: (i) being a tenant holding over after expiry of term; (ii) being a trespasser; (iii) by a person having good title; (iv) only partially; (v) by the Government?

Each of the five categories enumerated in the question has received authoritative judicial treatment and a distinct legal position has been settled. The analysis below addresses each category in turn.

(i) Tenant Holding Over After Expiry of Term

A tenant whose term has expired and who continues in possession — a "tenant holding over" — retains juridical possession for the purposes of both sections 5 and 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, even though that possession is not lawful in the strict contractual sense. The distinction between lawful and juridical possession is the critical analytical pivot in this category.

The Bombay High Court in KK Verma v Naraindas C Malkani, AIR 1954 Bom 358, authoritatively held that under Indian law, after the termination of tenancy, a tenant may not have a right to continue in possession, but the possession is juridical and protected by statute. This was affirmed as correct law by the Supreme Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620. The Supreme Court in MC Chockalingam v V Manickavasagam, AIR 1974 SC 104, (1974) 1 SCC 48, distinguished between lawful and juridical possession and held that a tenant on determination of the lease is in juridical possession, which is protected by law against wrongful dispossession, even though it cannot be equated with lawful possession.

The consequence is decisive: if the landlord forcibly dispossesses the tenant holding over — without obtaining an eviction decree from a competent court — such dispossession is otherwise than in due course of law within the meaning of section 6(1). As confirmed by section 6.12 of the authoritative commentary and the judicial line under it: "If a tenant holding over after expiry of his tenancy is forcibly dispossessed by the landlord, the dispossession is otherwise than in due course of law". A lessee forcibly evicted without an eviction order is entitled to be restored to possession, and a lessee in possession even one year after the expiry of the lease has juridical possession maintainable under section 6.

The tenant holding over accordingly has three concurrent remedies: (a) a summary suit under section 6 within six months, in which title is wholly irrelevant; (b) a possessory suit under section 5 read with Article 64, Limitation Act, 1963 within twelve years, on the strength of possessory title, which is good against all except the true owner; and (c) a suit on the strength of the lease title under Article 65, Limitation Act, 1963.

(ii) Person in Possession as a Trespasser

The rights of a trespasser who is dispossessed constitute one of the most contested areas under section 6 and attract a nuanced answer.

The general rule is that a person who takes forcible, clandestine, or casual possession — i.e., a trespasser who has not accomplished settled possession — cannot invoke section 6. The courts have consistently stated that a trespasser, having no right to remain on the property in the first instance, cannot claim the statutory remedy. Amirudin v Mahamad Jamal, ILR (1891) 15 Bom 685, is often cited for the proposition that a person who enters by force cannot take advantage of his own wrong.

The qualifying rule — settled possession — decisively limits the general principle. Where the trespasser's possession has matured into settled possession — actual, physical, undisturbed, open, continuous, to the knowledge of the owner, and sufficiently long — it is protected against everyone, including the true owner. The Supreme Court has laid down the test of settled possession authoritatively in Rame Gowda v M Varadappa Naidu, AIR 2004 SC 4609, (2004) 1 SCC 769: the possession must be (i) actual and physical over a sufficiently long period; (ii) to the knowledge of the true owner; (iii) accompanied by animus possidendi; and (iv) acquiesced to by the true owner. It is equally settled that "a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing and has not accomplished his possession, but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner" — Ram Rattan v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 619, (1977) 1 SCC 188. In such circumstances, the law requires the true owner to pursue remedies under the law.

Where settled possession exists, the trespasser may maintain: (a) a suit under section 6 within six months, with title irrelevant, even against the true owner; and (b) a suit under section 5 on possessory title (Article 64) against any person who cannot show a better title, as declared in Somnath Burman v Dr SP Raju, AIR 1970 SC 846, (1969) 3 SCC 129, and Nair Service Society v KC Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165. As between two trespassers, the one in prior possession who was dispossessed by the latter may sue on possessory title, and the defendant cannot resist by raising a jus tertii plea (Hajisa Imamsa Kairat v Kalyanrao Anantrao Kulkarni, AIR 1961 Mys 86).

However, a person who has taken possession by stealth or concealment, without the owner's knowledge, and has not been in possession long enough for it to be characterised as settled, has no right to sue and cannot invoke section 6. "Parties cannot wrongly imagine that they would acquire some right by merely intruding upon land in the night, running up a hut and occupying it before morning" (Burling v Read, (1848) 1 QB 904). Possession of encroachers on Government land, for instance, has been held not to attract the protective cover of section 6.

(iii) Dispossession by a Person Having Good Title

This is perhaps the most instructive application of section 6 and reveals its most radical feature: even the true owner is not permitted to take the law into his own hands.

The governing principle is expressed unambiguously: "the object is to prevent persons taking the law into their own hands, however good their title may be" — Sona Mia v Prokash Chandra Bhattacharjya, AIR 1940 Cal 464. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed this: "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a court" — Midnapur Zamindary Co Ltd v Naresh Narayan Roy, AIR 1924 PC 144.

Thus, within the six-month window of section 6, a person dispossessed by the true owner is entitled to restoration of possession, and the court will not permit the true owner's title to be set up as a defence: "the suit under section 6 cannot be resisted on the ground of title, so that the suit can be maintained even against the true owner if he has dispossessed the plaintiff, otherwise than in due course of law". The decree for restoration does not adjudicate upon title; the true owner's title is preserved and may be asserted in a subsequent plenary suit.

After six months, the position fundamentally changes. The dispossessed person may still file a suit under section 5 on possessory title within twelve years (Article 64), but the defendant — particularly if he is the true owner — may resist by proving title. As the Supreme Court held in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams v KM Krishnaiah, AIR 1998 SC 1132, (1998) 3 SCC 331, a suit filed beyond the six-month period had to fail because the defendant had subsisting title and could remain in possession. Thus, a person dispossessed by a true owner has a better remedy under section 6 than under the later possessory suit, since title becomes a material consideration after the summary period expires.

(iv) Partial Dispossession

A suit for recovery of possession lies even where the plaintiff's dispossession is partial, and the plaintiff need not sue for recovery of the entire property. Section 6 and the possessory suit under section 5 are both available where the plaintiff has been disturbed in only a portion of the property held by him.

The applicable principle is stated thus: "A possessory suit lies under this section, not only where the plaintiff's possession has been disturbed wholly, but also where it has been disturbed partially". The courts have confirmed this in practice: "where the plaintiff was dispossessed from a parcel of land situated in a village, of which he was the owner, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to sue for possession of that parcel without suing for possession of the entire village".

Further, the general rule that possession of part is, in law, possession of the whole (where the whole is otherwise vacant) operates in the plaintiff's favour in a partial dispossession scenario. A person without title who acquires possession of a part of land and proceeds to mark out the entire area he intends to possess will be presumed to be in possession of the whole, even though he has physical control over only a portion. In a suit under section 5, partial possession has been held to be a sufficient basis for the suit, and a co-owner in partial or exclusive possession of a defined share may sue under section 6 for restoration of that share.

(v) Dispossession by the Government

The position here is unambiguous by express statutory bar. Section 6(2)(b) absolutely prohibits a suit under section 6 against the Government. No suit for recovery of possession under the summary remedy can be maintained against the Government, regardless of the circumstances of dispossession. The bar is categorical and admits of no exception within the domain of section 6.

The rationale flows from the recognition that the Government exercises sovereign and statutory powers of resumption and acquisition, which are subject to constitutional and statutory safeguards rather than the private-law summary remedy.

However, the bar applies only to the section 6 remedy. It does not extinguish all rights of the dispossessed person. Several avenues remain open:

1. A plenary suit under section 5 of the Specific Relief Act — the Government is not exempted from section 5. A suit on title or possessory title under section 5 within the applicable period of limitation under Articles 64 or 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is maintainable against the Government.

2. Writ remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India — where the Government dispossesses without statutory authority or in breach of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) (as interpreted before the Forty-Fourth Amendment), a writ of mandamus or certiorari may lie. The courts have recognised that even a tenant under the Government cannot be dispossessed by force, and in MRS Ramakrishnan v Asst Director of Ex-Servicemen Welfare, a writ of mandamus was held maintainable. Even state authorities cannot dispossess a person by an executive order — "the government can resume possession only in a manner known to or recognised by law and not otherwise" (Meghmala v G Narasimha Reddy, (2010) 8 SCC 383).

3. Suit under other statutes — where a special statutory remedy exists, such as under the Land Acquisition Act, 2013 (The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act) or revenue laws, those remedies are available independently.

Settled Position

The cumulative legal position is that the protection of section 6 is broad and purposive: it extends to tenants holding over (whose juridical possession is protected regardless of the expiry of the term), to trespassers who have accomplished settled possession, and even to those dispossessed by the true owner, all within the six-month window. Partial dispossession is equally actionable. The only absolute exclusion within section 6 is a suit against the Government, though the dispossessed person retains the right to seek plenary relief under section 5 or constitutional remedies. The overarching principle — that no person may take forcible possession however good his title may be — pervades each category and remains the bedrock of Indian possessory law.