Define and classify injunctions. Distinguish between mandatory and prohibitory injunctions.

Injunction, in its essence, is a judicial command — an order by which a court either directs a person to do a specified act, or forbids him from doing one. It is the primary instrument of preventive relief under the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 36 of the Act states the foundational principle: preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. The word "preventive" is significant — unlike compensatory relief which looks backward at a wrong already done, an injunction looks forward and arrests the wrong before or during its commission.

Dr. Ian Spry, in his celebrated treatise on Equitable Remedies, defined an injunction as an order of equitable nature restraining the person to whom it is directed from performing a specified act, or, in certain exceptional cases, requiring him to perform a specified act. This dual character — the restraining and the compelling — forms the very basis of the two primary kinds of injunctions: prohibitory and mandatory.

The Two Primary Classifications

Prohibitory and Mandatory

A prohibitory injunction is the classical form. It forbids the defendant from doing a wrongful act that would infringe the plaintiff's right — whether legal or equitable. Its face is negative: the court tells the defendant, "you shall not do this." It is the natural guardian of negative obligations. When A threatens to trespass on B's land, when a defendant threatens to publish confidential communications, when a contractor threatens to sell goods in breach of an exclusive agreement — in all these cases, the court intervenes with a prohibitory command.

A mandatory injunction, by contrast, is the exceptional form. It compels the defendant to perform a positive act. Section 39 of the Act states that where, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach and also to compel the performance of the requisite act.

The classic illustration is the defendant who has put up a wall blocking the plaintiff's right of access to a road. The wrong has already been done; a merely prohibitory order saying "don't build more wall" is useless. The court must go further and say "remove the wall." That is a mandatory injunction — it compels the undoing of a wrongful state of things and restores the position to what it ought to have been. The Allahabad High Court, in Raghunath v. Municipal Board (AIR 1952 All 465), captured this precisely when it held that a mandatory injunction under section 39 can be issued to prevent the breach of an obligation — even one that is a condition precedent to the enforcement of the plaintiff's primary right.

Temporary and Perpetual

The second great classification, found in section 37 of the Act, is between temporary and perpetual injunctions. A temporary injunction — also called interlocutory or interim — is one that continues until a specified time or until further orders of the court. It is purely provisional in character. Its sole object, as the Supreme Court reiterated in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca-Cola Co. (AIR 1995 SC 2372), is to preserve the status quo pending a final decision — to prevent mischief in the interval before rights are authoritatively determined. It does not conclude any right; it merely holds the field.

A perpetual injunction, on the other hand, can only be granted by a decree at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit. Once granted, the defendant is perpetually enjoined — meaning for all time — from asserting a right or committing an act contrary to the plaintiff's rights. It concludes a right. As Kerr on Injunctions puts it, the perpetual injunction is in effect a decree; it is the definitive resolution of the dispute, not a provisional holding measure.

Distinction: Mandatory vs. Prohibitory

The distinction between the two types can be viewed from several important angles:

The Supreme Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden (AIR 1990 SC 867) laid down the conditions under which an interim mandatory injunction may be granted: there must be a strong prima facie case, there must be irreparable or serious injury that cannot ordinarily be compensated in money, and the balance of convenience must decisively favour the applicant. The standard is deliberately higher because a mandatory injunction at an interim stage essentially compels a positive act before the right is established — an order that can itself do serious harm to the defendant if ultimately the plaintiff fails.

The Supreme Court reinforced this in Metro Marins v. Bonus Watch Co. Pvt. Ltd. (AIR 2005 SC 1444): an interim mandatory injunction cannot issue unless the court is clearly satisfied that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties and that justice demands its restoration.

The Discretionary Character of the Remedy

Across both classifications, one principle remains constant: injunction is a discretionary remedy. Section 36 expressly vests this discretion in the court. The discretion, however, is not arbitrary — it is judicial discretion guided by recognized principles. As Story's Equity put it, the jurisdiction ought to be guarded with extreme caution, and applied only in very clear cases. The court weighs the mischief threatened to the plaintiff against the injury that the injunction would inflict on the defendant, considers whether damages are an adequate remedy, examines the conduct of the parties — including whether the plaintiff comes with clean hands — and then decides.

The appellate court, as a rule, is slow to interfere with such discretion unless the lower court has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or perversely, or has ignored the settled principles of law — as the Supreme Court reiterated in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (1990 Supp 1 SCC 727).