Define injunction. Distinguish between various kinds of injunctions.

Nature and Basis of the Remedy

Section 36 declares that preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by injunction, temporary or perpetual. The word "discretion" is not to be taken lightly — it is not an unbridled or arbitrary discretion, but one governed by recognised principles. Story, the great American jurist on equity, observed that this power, being summary in nature and liable to abuse, ought to be guarded with extreme caution and applied only in very clear cases. The Supreme Court confirmed this in Mandali Ranganna v T. Ramachandra (AIR 2008 SC 2291), holding that while considering an application for injunction, the court must look not only at the existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, but also at the conduct of the parties — a person seeking injunction must always come to court with clean hands.

The grant of injunction is hedged with one further practical limit: a court will not order a party to perform an act which it is incapable of performing, and it will not issue an injunction that would be wholly ineffectual. An order of injunction takes effect only from the date of its communication and when it is brought to the conscious knowledge of the party against whom it is directed.

The Statutory Classification: Section 37

Section 37 of the Act draws the primary legislative division between the two broad species of injunction. Sub-section (1) defines a temporary injunction as one that continues until a specific time or until the further order of the court, and which may be granted at any stage of the suit — regulated entirely by Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sub-section (2) defines a perpetual injunction as one that can only be granted by a decree passed at the hearing and upon the merits of the suit, by which the defendant is thereby perpetually enjoined from the assertion of a right or from the commission of an act which would be contrary to the rights of the plaintiff.

This fundamental statutory bifurcation can be expanded into four distinct kinds, which may be understood as follows.

Temporary Injunction

A temporary injunction — also called an interlocutory or ad interim injunction — is essentially a provisional remedy. Its sole object, as the Supreme Court stated in Wander Ltd v Antox India Pvt Ltd (1990 Supp 1 SCC 727), is to preserve the subject matter of the controversy in its then condition, without determining any question of right — merely to prevent the further perpetration of wrong pending a final decision. It exists to preserve the status quo.

Three conditions govern the grant of a temporary injunction, firmly settled by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd v Coca Cola Co. (AIR 1995 SC 2372): first, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case; second, the balance of convenience must favour the plaintiff; and third, refusal of the injunction must be likely to cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff. All three are cumulative, not alternative. Even where a strong prima facie case exists, if the injury is one capable of adequate compensation by damages, the injunction will be refused.

A temporary injunction is not an independent remedy — it is auxiliary to the final relief. The Supreme Court in Cotton Corporation of India v United Industrial Bank Ltd. (AIR 1983 SC 1272) settled a once-contested point: if the court cannot grant the final perpetual injunction, it cannot grant a temporary injunction in the same terms either, since the temporary remedy is in aid of the final one.

Perpetual (Permanent) Injunction

A perpetual injunction, governed by section 38, is the final and definitive relief. It can only be granted by a decree after a full hearing on the merits. Unlike a temporary injunction, it conclusively determines the rights of the parties. Section 38 identifies the circumstances in which such an injunction may be granted: where the defendant is a trustee of property for the plaintiff; where no standard exists for ascertaining actual damage; where compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; and where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

The distinction between a temporary and a perpetual injunction is fundamental in its character. A temporary injunction is based on a prima facie examination of the matter at an interlocutory stage, without going into the detailed merits of the case. A permanent injunction, on the other hand, rests on a thorough consideration of the evidence and the full merits of the controversy. As was held in Martin v Price (1894 1 Ch 276), a permanent injunction concludes the right of the parties.

Prohibitory Injunction

When classified by its nature and direction, an injunction is either prohibitory or mandatory. A prohibitory injunction — the more common and conventional form — restrains a defendant from doing a particular act. It operates negatively, commanding inaction. Section 38's language captures this: the defendant is "enjoined" — that is, commanded to desist. The typical cases include injunctions restraining trespass, waste, nuisance, infringement of intellectual property, or breach of a contractual restriction. This form of relief is relatively easier to obtain because the court is not compelling positive action; it is merely maintaining the existing state of affairs.

Mandatory Injunction

A mandatory injunction, governed by section 39, stands in a special and demanding category. Section 39 provides that where, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant a mandatory injunction. It is, by its nature, an affirmative command — it requires the defendant to do something positive, typically to undo what has already been done wrongfully.

Because a mandatory injunction commands positive action rather than mere abstention, courts apply to it a standard considerably more stringent than that for a prohibitory injunction. The Supreme Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden v Coomi Sorab Warden (AIR 1990 SC 867) evolved three conditions for the grant of an interlocutory mandatory injunction: first, the plaintiff must have a strong case for trial — not merely a prima facie case, but one of a distinctly higher order; second, it must be necessary to prevent irreparable or serious injury which ordinarily cannot be compensated in money; and third, the balance of convenience must favour the applicant. These principles were reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Mehtab Khan v Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan (AIR 2013 SC 1099), where the Court observed that the grant of interim mandatory relief requires the highest degree of satisfaction — it is indeed a rare power.

Mandatory injunctions are also limited in their scope by section 39 itself: the injunction is restricted strictly to the extent of the invasion of the plaintiff's right. The court, in granting such relief, will not order more than is necessary to neutralise the wrong, and will not compel works of considerable expense or engineering complexity where it cannot adequately supervise execution of its decree.

The Overarching Comparison

The following table brings together the distinguishing characteristics:

The Equity Underlying All Injunctions

Whatever the species, the foundation of all injunctive relief is equitable. The court will never grant an injunction to a party who has conducted himself inequitably — who has suppressed material facts, who has come to court with unclean hands, or who has been guilty of acquiescence or unreasonable delay. The Supreme Court in SP Chengalvaraya Naidu v Jagannath (AIR 1994 SC 853) stated emphatically that a decree for perpetual injunction obtained on suppression of material facts vitiates the entire proceedings and renders the decree a nullity. Equity insists that he who seeks the assistance of a court of conscience must himself have conducted himself conscientiously — for injunction, being a discretionary remedy, the court lends it only to those who deserve it.