State with examples what is preventive relief and when is it granted? Explain circumstances for mandatory injunction.

What Preventive Relief Is

Section 36 of the Specific Relief Act declares simply that preventive relief is granted at the discretion of the court by injunction — temporary or perpetual. An injunction, in the words of Spry, that celebrated jurist of equitable remedies, is an order of equitable nature restraining the person to whom it is directed from performing a specified act, or in certain exceptional cases requiring him to perform a specified act. In relation to a breach of contract, the proper remedy against a defendant who acts in breach of his obligations is either damages or specific relief, and where the specific relief takes the form of restraint rather than performance, it is achieved through the injunction.

The word "preventive" is significant. The whole genius of this remedy lies not in undoing what has been done — though a mandatory injunction can sometimes achieve that — but in arresting the mischief before it occurs or before it continues further. It is the court standing as a sentinel at the door, saying: this far and no further.

When Preventive Relief is Granted

The fundamental principle is that preventive relief will not be granted where compensation in money would afford adequate relief. As the Privy Council stated in Charles J. Wills v. Central Railway Co. of Canada (AIR 1914 PC 249), damages in substitution for an injunction are appropriate only where the injury to the plaintiff's legal right is small, capable of estimation in money, adequately compensable by money payment, and where the balance of convenience rests with the plaintiff. Conversely, where the injury is irreparable — where no sum of money could adequately place the plaintiff in the position he occupied before the wrong — preventive relief becomes the appropriate remedy.

Four broad circumstances trigger this relief most clearly, drawn from section 38(3) and its surrounding principles:

• Where there is no standard for ascertaining damage — As where A defames B in print: the law cannot put a reliable figure on the damage to one's reputation. In Ram Jethmalani v. Subramaniam Swamy (AIR 2006 Del 300), the Delhi High Court observed that honour and reputation are inherently incapable of being valued in terms of money. An injunction, not damages, is the proper remedy.

• Where compensation would not afford adequate relief — The courts have repeatedly held that money cannot be adequate relief where inconvenience is caused by noise, nuisance, or harassment. In Gotham Construction Co. v. Amulya Krishna Ghose (AIR 1968 Cal 91), the court held squarely that no monetary award can compensate a person for the hardship of living amid continuous hammering and noise. The same principle applies to trespass, obstruction of light and air, and interference with one's enjoyment of property.

• Where the defendant is a trustee — Where A, a trustee of B, is about to make an important sale of trust property, B may sue for an injunction to restrain that sale even if compensation in money might technically suffice, because the jurisdiction of the court is founded not on the irremediable consequences of the act but on the breach of trust itself.

• Where an injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings — Where the defendants repeatedly trespass over the plaintiff's land under a claim of right of way, compelling the plaintiff to sue afresh every time, a perpetual injunction becomes indispensable to avoid this proliferation of litigation.

Two further conditions cut across all these cases. First, the obligation whose breach is apprehended must be a legal obligation — every duty enforceable by law — not merely a moral or social expectation. Where no legal obligation is spelt out, no injunction can be granted. Second, the plaintiff must approach the court with clean hands: a person who has acted unfairly, suppressed material facts, or obtained a temporary advantage by unlawful means forfeits the equitable relief of injunction.

The Mandatory Injunction: Section 39

Among the forms of preventive relief, the mandatory injunction occupies a uniquely demanding position. Section 39 provides that when, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of and also to compel performance of the requisite acts.

While a prohibitory injunction commands inaction — "do not do this" — a mandatory injunction commands positive action: "undo what you have wrongfully done" or "do this specific thing." Its purpose is restoration — to put matters back to the state they were in before the wrongful act. As the commentators observe, a mandatory injunction cannot be granted to create a new state of things; its object is to restore the status quo ante, not to engineer a fresh advantage for the plaintiff.

Circumstances for Mandatory Injunction

Because it compels positive action rather than mere abstention, a mandatory injunction is a remedy that courts grant with the greatest caution. The House of Lords in Redland Bricks Ltd. v. Morris (1970 AC 652) articulated four governing principles that have been adopted and applied by Indian courts:

First, the plaintiff must show a very strong probability upon the facts that grave damage will accrue to him. This is a materially higher threshold than the "prima facie case" required for a prohibitory injunction. The Supreme Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden (AIR 1990 SC 867) firmly established that for an interlocutory mandatory injunction, the plaintiff must demonstrate a strong case for trial — not merely an arguable one — and that this standard is distinctly elevated beyond that applicable to prohibitory interim relief. This principle was later reaffirmed in Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan (AIR 2013 SC 1099), where the Supreme Court observed that the grant of interim mandatory relief requires the highest degree of satisfaction of the court.

Second, damages must not be a sufficient or adequate remedy. If the wrongful act complained of can be fully compensated by an award of money, the court will refuse the mandatory injunction. This mirrors the general principle that injunctions are not granted where damages are adequate — but the threshold is even higher in the case of mandatory relief because the court is being asked to compel a party to act, often at great cost or inconvenience to that party.

Third, the cost to the defendant of complying with the mandatory order — the expense of doing the works or taking the steps ordered — must be an element the court weighs. This is a consideration unique to mandatory injunctions and not ordinarily relevant to prohibitory ones. Where the mandatory order would be grossly disproportionate in its burden upon the defendant relative to the benefit to the plaintiff, the court may decline to grant it and award damages in lieu. The court, in the exercise of its discretion, must always keep in view the balance between the hardship of granting and the hardship of refusing.

Fourth, the court must be careful to ensure that the defendant knows exactly, as a matter of fact and not merely of law, what he is required to do. The mandatory order must be so precise and definite in its terms that the defendant can give his contractors clear instructions for compliance. A vague mandatory injunction is not merely impractical — it is unjust, because a man cannot be held in contempt for disobeying an order that does not plainly tell him what he must do.

Illustrations of Mandatory Injunctions in Practice

These principles come alive most vividly through examples drawn from the decided cases. Where a neighbour wrongfully constructed a building that blocked the plaintiff's windows, re-erecting his house so as to darken the principal rooms and render them unfit for use during the day without artificial light, the court issued a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to pull down so much of the house as was necessary to stop the injury — because money could not restore the plaintiff's enjoyment of his home. Again, where a co-owner of property unilaterally occupied the front portion of a jointly held estate abutting the road and put up a construction without the consent of his co-owner, a mandatory injunction was granted directing removal of the unauthorised structure.

A tenant wrongfully dispossessed during the pendency of a civil suit has been held entitled to an interlocutory mandatory injunction directing restoration of possession, because to leave him without relief until trial would be to render the final decree infructuous. And the Allahabad High Court in Raghunath v. Municipal Board, Mathura (AIR 1952 All 465) took the doctrine one step further: it held that a mandatory injunction may be granted even against a party who owes no direct obligation to the plaintiff, if the performance of that party's obligation to a third person is a condition precedent to the securing of the plaintiff's right.

What the cases consistently reveal is that the mandatory injunction is not an alternative name for specific performance, nor a shortcut to trial. It is an exceptional remedy, granted in rare and clear cases, where the wrong is established, the injury is real and incapable of monetary cure, and the court is satisfied beyond a high degree of probability that justice demands restoration rather than compensation.